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INTRODUCTION 
The transnational world of business frequently requires parties and 
courts to obtain evidence located in foreign nations for dispute resolution.  
For foreign litigants, this often means seeking evidence located in the 
United States.  Historically, foreign parties have been required to use 
stringent diplomatic measures, such as the Hague Evidence Convention, to 
obtain evidence located in the United States.1  Statute 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) 
sought to simplify the process and provide foreign proceedings a less 
formal yet effective method for obtaining judicial assistance from U.S. 
courts.2  
                                                          
 1. See, e.g., Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, art. I, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 2557, 847 U.N.T.S. 231, 241 [hereinafter 
―HEC‖] (―In civil or commercial matters a judicial authority of a Contracting State may, in 
accordance with the provisions of the law of that State, request the competent authority of 
another Contracting State, by means of a Letter of Request, to obtain evidence, or to 
perform some other judicial act.‖); Organization of American States, Inter-American 
Convention on Letters Rogatory, art. II, Jan. 30, 1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 43, 14 I.L.M. 339 
(―This Convention shall apply to letters rogatory . . . that have as their purpose . . . the 
taking of evidence and the obtaining of information abroad . . . .‖). 
 2. Compare HEC, supra note 1, with 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006). See generally infra 
Part III.A (discussing the statute‘s relatively simple measures for obtaining evidence).  
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Section 1782(a), which permits parties before a ―foreign or international 
tribunal‖ to request U.S. judicial assistance in obtaining evidence, 
supplanted strict, formalistic conditions that hindered foreign requests for 
judicial assistance.3  The statute permits foreign party requests to be sent 
directly to district courts without necessitating the use of diplomatic 
channels.4  It was enacted in an attempt to promote international judicial 
comity with hopes that other nations would follow similar practice.5  
While § 1782(a)‘s presence in foreign litigation is well established, 
courts have continually contemplated its application in private international 
arbitration6 proceedings.7  Courts have struggled to determine whether the 
                                                          
 3. Id. 
 4. See id.  For example, under the HEC, requests for evidence must be sent to the 
Central Authority designated by the signatory of the treaty and may not be sent to any other 
authority or agency within the state.  See HEC, supra note 1, at 2558. 
 5. See S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 2 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3783.  
Congress enacted § 1782 to assist foreign proceedings and parties by ―bringing the United 
States to the forefront of nations adjusting their procedures to those of sister nations,‖ with 
the goal of encouraging foreign nations to correspondingly adjust their procedures.  Id.  
 6. The term ―private international arbitration‖ has no definitive definition.  It is used in 
this Comment to encompass commercial arbitration with some international aspects, 
adjudicated by a (private) non-governmental body and without the implication of a bilateral 
investment treaty (―BIT‖).  See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 14 (3d ed. 1999) (―[T]he international nature of 
arbitration does not mean that the parties must necessarily be of different nationalities.  By 
virtue of its object, the contract can nevertheless extend beyond national borders, when for 
example, a contract is concluded between two nationals of the same State for performance 
in another country, or when it is concluded between a State and a subsidiary of a foreign 
company doing business in that State.‖ (quoting The International Solution to International 
Business Disputes—ICC Arbitration, ICC PUBLICATION No. 301 (1977), at 19)); id. at 19  
(―The term ‗commercial‘ should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover matters arising 
from all relationships of a commercial nature, . . . includ[ing] . . . any trade transaction for 
the supply or exchange of goods or services; distribution agreement; commercial 
representation or agency; factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting; engineering; 
licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance; exploitation agreement or concession; 
joint venture and other forms of industrial or business co-operation; carriage of goods or 
passengers by air, sea, rail or road.‖ (quoting U.N. Comm. on Int‘l Trade L., UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Int‘l Comm. Arb., art. 1 n.2 U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985) (amended 2006)).  
Although the UNCITRAL encompasses the term ―investment‖ in a general sense, it does not 
necessarily include public investment international law, such as investments made pursuant 
to BITs.  See Julian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning of “Investment”:  ICSID‟s Traveaux 
and the Domain of International Investment Law, 51 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 257, 258 (2010) 
(discussing the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (―ICSID‖), 
which serves as a forum to adjudicate bilateral and multilateral investment treaty disputes 
between States and individual foreign investors).  Although § 1782(a)‘s application in 
public international arbitration, that is investment arbitration concerning a State and a 
private individual or entity by contractual means of a BIT, is also debated, this Comment 
will focus solely on  
§ 1782(a)‘s application in private international arbitration. See generally ALAN REDFERN ET 
AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 22 (4th ed. 2004) 
(discussing the differences between public and private arbitration).   
 7. Compare Hans Smit, A-National Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 629, 639 (1989) 
(noting that statutes providing assistance to international tribunals should include arbitration 
tribunals), with NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 189-91 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding 
that since § 1782 is silent as to international arbitration, it cannot be used as a tool to obtain 
evidence for this type of proceeding).   
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statutory language or the legislative history envisaged private international 
arbitration as a ―foreign or international tribunal.‖8  In addition, courts have 
examined whether     § 1782(a) actually furthers the goals of private 
international arbitration, or whether permitting the use of the statute to 
obtain evidence undermines the federal government‘s rationale behind its 
pro-arbitration policy.9 
Arbitration, a private system of dispute resolution, permits parties to 
choose to resolve their disputes outside the judicial system.10  It provides a 
neutral forum for parties to settle their dispute, rather than a ―home court‖ 
advantage of one or the other party.11 It is relatively speedier and less costly 
than litigation because parties can choose the procedural rules and the 
forum where the arbitration will take place before a dispute arises.12  
Arbitration also has limited discovery.13 Further, arbitration awards are 
final and binding with narrow grounds for their vacation or annulment.14  
The U.S. government has maintained a pro-arbitration policy because 
federal court litigation is ―costly and time consuming,‖ whereas arbitration 
provides ―a swift, fair, and inexpensive remedy.‖15  It also lessens the 
                                                          
 8. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 185. 
 9. See In re Medway Power Ltd., 985 F. Supp. 402, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that 
§ 1782 is only for evidence to be used in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings rather than 
for a private arbitration panel, of which the authority is based on a private agreement 
between the parties).  But see Daniel A. Losk, Note, Section 1782(a) After Intel:  
Reconciling Policy Considerations and a Proposed Framework to Extend Judicial 
Assistance to International Arbitral Tribunals, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1035, 1057–58 (2005) 
(citing the federal policy towards arbitration as proof of § 1782(a)‘s applicability for 
international arbitration).  
 10. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Updating Arbitrator Ethics, 10 NO. 4 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 
24, 24 (2004) (contending that resolving disputes outside of the judicial system permits 
parties to overcome jurisdictional limitations of traditional courts).  
 11. See John Fellas, Stagey in International Litigation, 826 PLI/Lit 213, 218 (discussing 
the advantages in choosing arbitration, instead of litigation, to resolve international 
commercial disputes). 
 12. See MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION at 1 (2008) (noting that particularly in the realm of international 
commercial arbitration, parties champion the ability to have their disputes resolved in a 
neutral forum by decision makers (arbitrators) chosen by the parties).  
 13. See Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 390 (4th Cir. 1980) (―When contracting parties 
stipulate that disputes will be submitted to arbitration, they relinquish the right to certain 
procedural niceties which are normally associated with a formal trial . . . .  One of these 
accoutrements is the right to pre-trial discovery.  While an arbitration panel may subpoena 
documents or witnesses . . . the litigating parties have no comparable privilege.‖) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted); MOSES, supra note 12, at 4 (noting that arbitration is normally a 
shorter process than litigation in part because there is less discovery). 
 14. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581–90 (2008) (emphasizing the 
Federal Arbitration Act‘s limited and exclusive grounds for judicial review of an arbitration 
award to facilitate arbitration‘s finality and efficiency); see also infra note 112 (discussing 
the limited grounds for review of an arbitral award).  
 15. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 747, 748 (1981) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).  
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burden on the federal court dockets by providing an effective alternative 
forum.16  
Early decisions uniformly excluded § 1782(a)‘s application in private 
international arbitration, finding that the statutory language and legislative 
history did not contemplate private arbitration as an ―international tribunal‖ 
under the statute.17  In 2004, however, the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,18 expanded the established 
notions of what constituted an ―international tribunal.‖19  Although the 
Supreme Court in Intel did not address the question of whether private 
international arbitration proceedings are ―tribunals‖ pursuant to the statute, 
many courts have broadened the holding and permitted foreign arbitration 
proceedings to utilize § 1782(a) to obtain evidence.20  
This Comment argues that, based on § 1782(a)‘s language and legislative 
history, private international arbitration proceedings are not ―foreign or 
international tribunals‖ pursuant to the statute.  Part I traces the historical 
development of U.S. judicial assistance in foreign proceedings.  It then 
explores formation of § 1782(a) through its many amendments.  Part II 
explains the divergent readings that circuit courts currently apply to § 
1782(a) and the uncertainty that the Intel decision created.21  Part III 
examines the statute‘s plain language and extensive legislative history.  It 
further analyzes the policy implications behind contracting to arbitrate and 
the reasons why the use of § 1782(a) in private international arbitration 
would undermine the fundamental advantages of participating in 
arbitration.  This Part concludes that although Congress sought to liberalize 
                                                          
 16. See generally John E. Taylor, Helping Those Who Help Themselves:  The Fourth 
Circuit‟s Treatment of Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Discrimination 
Claims in Brown v. ABR Freight Systems, Inc. and EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 239,  n.178  (2000) (contending that recent court decisions supporting arbitration 
clauses have been primarily motivated by the desire to clear federal dockets).  
 17. See, e.g., NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 185 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding 
that the International Chamber of Commerce is not a ―foreign tribunal‖ for purposes of § 
1782(a)); Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int‘l, 168 F.3d 880, 881 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce arbitral panel was not a ―tribunal‖ 
under § 1782(a)).  
 18. 542 U.S. 241 (2004).  
 19. See id. at 258 (―[t]he term ‗tribunal‘ . . . includes investigating magistrates, 
administrative and arbitral tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies, as well as conventional 
civil, commercial, criminal, and administrative courts.‖) (quoting Hans Smit, International 
Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1015, 1026 n.71)).  
 20. See, e.g., In re Application of Oxus Gold PCL, No. MISC. 06-82, 2006 WL 
2927615, at *10 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2006) (granting a request for discovery pursuant to      § 
1782(a) for an arbitration proceeding); In re Roz Trading Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1228 
(N.D. Ga. 2006) (holding that the International Chamber of Commerce is a ―foreign 
tribunal‖ under § 1782(a) based on Intel even though the Supreme Court did not address the 
question of international arbitration proceedings directly).  
 21. See John Fellas, Using Section 1782 in International Arbitration, 23 ARB. INT‘L 
379, 379 (2007) (discussing how § 1782 has only recently been considered applicable to 
international arbitration); supra note 17 and accompanying text.   
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§ 1782(a) through its amendments, it excluded private international 
arbitration to maintain the practical benefits of participating in arbitration 
and to preserve the principles underlying the federal government‘s pro-
arbitration policy.  
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Historical Development of Judicial Assistance in Foreign Proceedings  
With the emergence of the transnational world, Congress increasingly 
realized that federal courts would have an important role in strengthening 
diplomatic relations by facilitating international proceedings.22  In 1855, as 
confirmation of courts‘ diplomatic importance, Congress passed the first 
act to provide judicial assistance to foreign courts.23  The Act of March 2, 
1885 permitted federal courts to grant foreign courts assistance in locating 
evidence in the United States, through the use of letters rogatory.24  Despite 
its potential significance, however, the Act had minimal impact because a 
recording error caused it to be absent from the index of federal codes, 
leaving federal courts unaware of its enactment.25 
The Act of 1885 did not accomplish the goal of facilitating international 
comity among the courts, and Congress further limited the use of letters 
rogatory for assistance to foreign proceedings with its enactment of the Act 
of 1863.26  Since the Act of 1863 created more limitations for judicial 
                                                          
 22. See Brian Eric Bomstein & Julie M. Levitt, Comment, Much Ado about 1782:   
A Look at Recent Problems with Discovery in the United States for Use in Foreign 
Litigation Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 429, 429–30 (1989) 
(noting that in order for foreign courts to render competent and fair judgments, they need all 
necessary facts, which requires U.S. court assistance for obtaining evidence); Harry LeRoy 
Jones, International Judicial Assistance:  Procedural Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62 
YALE L.J. 515, 540 (1953). 
 23. Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630 (1855).  In 1855, when a French 
court submitted a request to the State Department for assistance in securing testimony for a 
French proceeding, the United States government realized that it had no statutory grant of 
power to execute the letter rogatory.  Rogatory Commissions, 7 Op. Att‘y Gen. 56, 56 
(1855).  In response to the lack of statutory grant, Congress enacted Act of March 2, 1855.  
Id. at 57. 
 24. See § 2, 10 Stat. at 630.  The Act permitted circuit courts ―to compel the witnesses 
to appear and depose in the same manner as to appear and testify in court.‖  Id.  Requests for 
Assistance were made through letters rogatory and transmitted through diplomatic channels.  
Id.  Letters rogatory are defined as ―requests from courts in one country to the judiciary of a 
foreign country requesting the performance of an act which, if done without the sanction of 
the foreign court, could constitute a violation of that country‘s sovereignty.‖  Preparation of 
Letters Rogatory, U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS,  
http://travel.state.gov/law/judicial/judicial_683.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2010).  
 25. See Jones, supra note 22, at 540 n.77 (noting that the Act was incorrectly ―indexed 
in the Statutes at Large only under the heading ‗Mistrials‘‖).  
 26. Compare § 2, 10 Stat. at 630, with Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 95, 12 Stat. 769, 770 
(1863).  The Act of March 3, 1863 added three additional requirements before judicial 
assistance would be granted.  The additional requirements were (1) the foreign country 
requesting assistance must be a party or have an interest in the case, (2) the suit must seek 
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assistance to foreign courts, most federal courts declined to exercise 
judicial assistance to foreign proceedings altogether.27  While Congress had 
intended to give federal courts statutory authority to assist foreign courts in 
their proceedings abroad, they inadvertently constricted judicial 
assistance.28   
In recognition of their previous failed attempts at foreign judicial assistance 
and the necessity for the United States to espouse these foreign 
proceedings, Congress amended the Act of 1863 and codified these 
changes as 28 U.S.C. § 1782.29  
B. The Amended Language of § 1782(a) 
Although Congress‘s previous attempts to ―expand‖ judicial assistance 
rendered the statute futile, the 1948 and 1949 amendments provided actual 
statutory authority to grant judicial assistance to foreign proceedings.30  
The 1948 amendment significantly broadened the statute by removing the 
requirement that a foreign nation requesting judicial assistance be a party to 
or have an interest in the proceedings.31  Additionally, in 1949 Congress 
replaced the term ―civil action‖ with ―judicial proceeding.‖32  As a result, 
                                                          
monetary or property restitution, and (3) the country requesting assistance must be a friendly 
country with United States. § 4, 12 Stat. at 769–70.  Courts relied on the stringent measures 
of the 1863 Act and declined to exercise judicial assistance for most requests.  See Jones, 
supra note 22, at 540–41.   
 27. See, e.g., In re Letters Rogatory from Examining Magistrate of Tribunal of 
Versailles, France, 26 F. Supp. 852, 853 (D. Md. 1939) (relying on the Act of March 3, 
1863, the court denied judicial assistance); In re Spanish Consul‘s Petition, 22 F. Cas. 854, 
854 (S.D.N.Y. 1867) (the court denied request for judicial assistance relying on the Act of 
March 3, 1863); see also Jones supra note 22, at 515 (discussing that while the United 
States fortified ―economic, military, and cultural cooperation with other nations,‖ the 
government overlooked the area of judicial assistance, imposing hardships on both foreign 
and domestic lawyers and litigants); Walter B. Stahr, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for 
Foreign and International Proceedings, 30 VA. J. INT‘L L. 597, 602 (1990) (contending that 
due to the federal court‘s unawareness of the 1855 Act and the rigid measures of the 1863 
Act, it was easier to obtain judicial assistance from state courts than federal courts).  
 28. See Jones, supra note 22 at 540–41 (noting that for almost a century foreign 
requests for evidence were denied by the federal courts and the federal government did 
nothing to encourage judicial assistance); see also Stahr, supra note 27.     
 29. See Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. 80-773, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869 (1948); S. REP. NO. 
88-1580, at 7 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788.  The amendments of 
§ 1782 seek to clarify and liberalize existing U.S. judicial assistance procedures.  See H.R. 
REP. NO. 80-308, at A153 (1947) (―[I]mprovement of communications and the expected 
growth of foreign commerce will inevitably increase litigation involving witnesses separated 
by wide distances.‖).  
 30. § 1782, 62 Stat. at 949; Act of May 24, 1949, Pub. L. 81-72, ch. 139, sec. 93, 
§ 1782, 63 Stat. 89, 103 (1949). 
 31. See § 1782, 62 Stat. at 949 (―The deposition of any witness residing within the 
United States to be used in any civil action pending in any court in a foreign country with 
which the United States is at peace may be taken before a person authorized to administer 
oaths designated by the district court of any district where the witness resides or may be 
found.‖) (emphasis added).  
 32. See sec. 93, § 1782, 63 Stat. at 103.    
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by 1949, federal courts could compel oral testimony of any witness found 
within the United States for use in a pending foreign judicial proceeding.33 
As international trade and commercial activities continued to develop, 
Congress recognized that the previous amendments were insufficient for 
the evolving needs of the international business community.34  In order to 
better meet these needs, in the late 1950s Congress created the Commission 
on International Rules of Judicial Procedure (―International Rules 
Commission‖) to study and recommend modifications for foreign judicial 
assistance in regard to service of process and obtaining evidence.35  
Professor Hans Smit directed the project and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who 
eventually wrote the Supreme Court‘s Intel opinion, served as an associate 
director.36  In 1964, Congress unanimously adopted the International Rules 
Commission‘s proposals, including a complete overhaul of § 1782(a), 
without alteration.37  
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the 1964 amendments stated 
that the twin aims of the statute were ―[to] provid[e] equitable and 
efficacious procedures for the benefit of tribunals and litigants involved in 
litigation with international aspects . . . [as well as] invite foreign countries 
similarly to adjust their procedures.‖38  The 1964 amendments permitted 
federal courts to compel the production of various types of evidence 
located in the United States, including documents and oral testimony.39  In 
                                                          
 33. See Jones, supra note 22 at 541–42.  Although the statute was revised from the 
1855 Act, it was still limited to the taking of depositions.  Act of June 25, 1948,  
§ 1782, 62 Stat. at 949.  
 34. See S. REP. NO. 85-2393, at 3 (1958) (stating that the significant increase in 
business transactions required a ―comprehensive study‖ to ensure an optimal level of 
judicial assistance was being provided to the foreign courts).   
 35. See Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, § 2, 72 Stat. 1743.  The purpose of the 
Commission was to draft  
procedures necessary or incidental to the conduct and settlement of litigation in 
State and Federal Courts and quasi-judicial agencies which involve the 
performance of acts in foreign territory, such as the service of judicial documents, 
the obtaining of evidence, and the proof of foreign law, . . . [that are] more readily 
ascertainable, efficient, economical, and expeditious. 
Id.; see also Hans Smit, Recent Developments in International Litigation, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 
215, 218 (1994) (noting that the two goals of the project were (1) to assist the Commission 
in developing rules of international comity in litigation, and (2) to create studies of foreign 
procedures to provide a basis for comparative study generally in the United States). 
 36. Sarah E. Valentine, Ruth Bader Ginsburg:  An Annotated Bibliography, 7 N.Y. 
CITY L. REV. 391, 397 (2004). 
 37. See Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, sec. 9, § 1782, 78 Stat. 995, 997 
(1964); Stephan B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner:  Making Procedural Law for 
International Civil Litigation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 107–11 (1994) (noting that 
the Commission‘s recommendations were unanimously accepted ―without change‖).  
 38. S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 12–13 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3793–
94.  
 39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006).  If a federal court grants discovery pursuant to 
§ 1782(a), then the federal rules of civil procedure will govern the request.  See FED. R. CIV. 
P. 26(b)(1) (―Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is 
relevant to any party‘s claim or defense—including the existence, description, nature, 
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addition, the phrase ―judicial proceedings pending in any court in a foreign 
country with which the United States is at peace‖ was replaced by 
―proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal,‖ which expanded the 
proceedings that could utilize § 1782(a).40   
In 1996, to further broaden the scope of foreign tribunals that could 
utilize § 1782(a), Congress explicitly added ―criminal investigations 
conducted before formal accusation‖ as a type of foreign tribunal pursuant 
to the statute.41   
Currently, the statute states in pertinent part:  ―The district court of the 
district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his 
testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a 
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal 
investigations conducted before formal accusation.‖42 
The statute further provides:   
The order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request 
made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of 
any interested person and may direct that the testimony or statement be 
given, or the document or other thing be produced, before a person 
appointed by the court . . . . To the extent that the order does not 
prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the 




Thus, § 1782(a) permits a district court to grant a petitioner‘s request for 
judicial assistance if:  (1) the discovery sought ―resides or is found‖ within 
the district; (2) the requesting party is a foreign or international tribunal or 
an ―interested person‖ in the proceeding; and (3) the discovery is sought 
―for use‖ in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal.44  
                                                          
custody, condition and location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity 
and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter . . . . Relevant information 
need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence.‖ (emphasis added)); see also S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 
7, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788.  The American-style production of 
documents is especially problematic because most civil law nations do not permit similar 
extensive pre-trial discovery proceedings.  See HEC supra note 1, art. 23 (reservations in the 
Convention are taken by nations such as France and Germany, which prohibit the 
production of all or most documents in pre-trial discovery).   
 40. See sec. 9(a), § 1782, 78 Stat. at 997. 
 41. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106,   § 
1342(b), 110 Stat. 486, 486 (1996).   
 42. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2006).  
 43. Id.  
 44. See id.  See generally Scott R. Boesel, Arbitration Bodies Should be Considered 
Tribunals Under § 1782:  An analysis of NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 63 ALB. L. REV. 637, 
648–52 (1999) (discussing how the 1964 amendments expanded the scope of                § 
1782(a)).  
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Section 1782(a) does not define ―international tribunal‖ or ―foreign . . . 
tribunal.‖45  However, the Senate Report noted that Congress used the word 
―tribunal‖ to ensure ―assistance [was] not confined to proceedings before 
conventional courts,‖ and to permit its extension to other foreign 
governmental bodies, including investigating magistrates, administrative 
bodies, and quasi-judicial agencies.46  The Senate Report also referenced a 
1962 article by Hans Smit that advocated the liberalization of U.S. judicial 
assistance to international tribunals.47  However, despite the clear 
indications that Congress intended to broaden the statute, the plain 
language and the legislative history of § 1782(a) did not contemplate 
expanding its use outside governmental adjudicatory bodies to include 
private international arbitrations as ―tribunals.‖48  
II. INTEL CORP. V. ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES, INC.:  THE BEGINNING OF 
INCONGRUENCE AMONG THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Congress failed to clearly define what constitutes an ―international 
tribunal,‖ and as a result, the circuits have applied different standards to 
determine whether the party requesting judicial assistance is part of a 
―tribunal‖ pursuant to § 1782(a).49  The Second and Fifth Circuits have 
held that private international arbitrations are not ―tribunals‖ because 
§ 1782(a) was intended solely for governmental adjudicatory bodies.50  
Further, these Circuits have found that legislative history and public policy 
support their exclusion from the statute.51 
However, because dicta in Intel suggested that arbitration panels may be 
considered ―international tribunals‖ without further elaboration, some 
                                                          
 45. See S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 7–8 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788 
(lacking any narrow definitions for the pertinent terms). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Hans Smit, Assistance Rendered by the United States in Proceedings before 
International Tribunals, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1264, 1267, 1274 (1962) (cited in S. REP. NO. 
88-1580, at 8 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3784, 3789) (noting that because the 
United States has accepted the compulsory competence of the International Court of Justice, 
the United States should also assist other foreign tribunals).  
 48. See infra parts III.A and B. (discussing why the plain language and legislative 
history exclude private international arbitration from § 1782(a)).  
 49. Compare NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding 
that among other reasons, policy considerations and legislative history of  
§ 1782(a) indicate ―that Congress did not intend for [the] statute to apply to an arbitral body 
established by private parties.‖), with In re Application of Roz Trading, Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 
2d 1221, 1227–28 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (in applying the factors from Intel, the court, located 
within the Fifth Circuit, held that arbitral proceedings are ―foreign tribunals‖ pursuant to 
§ 1782(a)). 
 50. See Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int‘l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that the term ―international tribunal‖ in § 1782(a) was never calculated to assist in 
private international arbitration); NBC, 165 F.3d at 191 (holding that an arbitral tribunal is 
not a ―foreign tribunal‖ pursuant to § 1782(a)).   
 51. See Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 883; NBC, 165 F.3d at 191. 
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courts have misapplied the rationale set forth in Intel and utilized § 1782(a) 
for private international arbitrations.52  
Thus, a number of post-Intel courts have focused their analysis on the 
dicta of Intel, using the factors set forth in that decision, while the Second 
and Fifth Circuits have ascribed greater importance to the language and the 
legislative history of § 1782(a).53  As discussed in Part III, giving greater 
deference to the statutory language and legislative history achieves the twin 
aims of the statute while preserving the fundamental advantages of 
participating in arbitration.54  
A. Before Intel, the Second and Fifth Circuits Did Not Authorize the Use 
of  
§ 1782(a) for Private International Arbitration Proceedings 
Recognizing § 1782(a)‘s ambiguous use of ―international tribunal,‖ the 
Second and Fifth Circuits have relied on statutory language, legislative 
history, and public policy to exclude international arbitration proceedings 
from use of the statute.55  The Second Circuit first adopted this position in 
NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co.,56 holding that    § 1782(a)‘s language and 
legislative history did not support including private arbitration proceedings 
                                                          
 52.  See, e.g., In re Roz Trading, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 1225–28 (citing Intel Corp. v. 
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004)) (reasoning that since the arbitration 
proceeding is a first-instance decision maker, it is a ―foreign tribunal‖ under § 1782(a)); In 
re Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233, 238–40 (D. Mass. 2008) (reasoning that a 
private, international arbitral body, operated by the International Chamber of Commerce, 
was a ―tribunal‖ within meaning of § 1782(a)); see also In re Oxus Gold PLC, MISC No. 
06-82-GEB, 2007 WL 1037387, at *5  
(D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2007) (holding that the framework defined by two nations and governed by 
UNITCRAL is a ―foreign tribunal‖ under § 1782(a)).  But see  
La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelecctrica Del Rio Lempa v. El Paso Corp., 617 F. Supp. 2d 
481, 486–87 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (holding that § 1782(a) did not extend to arbitral tribunals).  
 53. Compare supra note 51, with supra note 52 (discussing courts that have focused on 
the factors specified in Intel).  It is important to note that the Second Circuit has not always 
excluded arbitral panels from § 1782(a).  Prior to NBC, in 1994, the Southern District of 
New York, without authority and in dicta, concluded that arbitrations are ―tribunals‖ under § 
1782(a).  In re Technostroyexport, 853 F. Supp. 695, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).  However, three 
years later the same district court reached the opposition conclusion, excluding arbitral 
panels from § 1782(a).  In In re Medway Power Ltd., the court assessed the ―plain meaning‖ 
of the statute and examined the procedural differences between litigation and arbitration, 
determining that an arbitral panel was not a ―tribunal‖ for purposes under § 1782(a).  985 F. 
Supp. 402, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).  The court reasoned that private arbitration clauses are 
―creatures of a contract which a court should enforce just like any other obligation imposed 
by a private agreement.‖  Id. at 403.   
 54. See infra Part III and accompanying notes.  Cf. Nathan Reierson, Comment, Out of 
Bounds?  Applicability of Federal Discovery Orders Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1782 by 
International Athletic Governing Bodies for use in Internal Dispute Resolution Procedures,  
19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 631, 647 (1999) (arguing that limiting § 1782(a) to exclude 
arbitration disputes would be contrary to public policy because the statute would facilitate 
discovery and improve the representation of clients).   
 55. See infra notes 56-77 and accompanying text.  
 56. 165 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 1999).  
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as ―international tribunals.‖57   
The National Broadcasting Company (―NBC‖) had requested discovery 
from a third-party financial institution for use in a private foreign 
arbitration proceeding between NBC and Azteca, S.A. de C.V. (―Azteca‖), 
a Mexican Company, administered by the International Chamber of 
Commerce (―ICC‖).58  Initially the district court granted the discovery 
requests, but later it quashed the subpoenas, reasoning that the terms 
―foreign or international tribunal‖ in § 1782(a) did not extend to private 
international arbitration.59  The Second Circuit affirmed the district court‘s 
order quashing the discovery, confirming that a private international 
arbitration was not a ―foreign or international tribunal‖ under § 1782(a).60  
To determine whether the ICC was a ―foreign or international tribunal,‖ 
the Second Circuit first examined the language of the statute.61  
Recognizing that § 1782(a)‘s language was insufficient to include or 
exclude international arbitration proceedings, the court looked to the 
statute‘s legislative history and concluded that Congress only intended to 
provide assistance to governmental authorities.62  The court reasoned that 
Congress had added ―administrative or investigative courts, acting as state 
instrumentalities or with the authority of the state‖ when it broadened the 
statute‘s language in the 1964 amendment to ―foreign or international 
tribunal‖ and did not contemplate extending the use beyond governmental 
adjudicatory bodies.63  Thus, under this rationale, while governmental 
arbitral bodies could be considered ―international tribunals,‖ private 
international arbitration was excluded.64  
The Second Circuit also examined the policy implications of construing 
§ 1782(a) to extend to private international arbitration.65  The court 
                                                          
 57. Id. at 190–91.  
 58. Id. at 185–86.  The ICC is a private administrative body that is responsible for 
supervising the arbitration process for the parties that choose ICC Institutional Arbitration.  
MOSES, supra note 12, at 10. 
 59. In re NBC, No. M-77 (RWS), 1998 WL 19994, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1998).  
 60. NBC, 165 F.3d at 185.   
 61. See id. at 188. 
 62. Id. at 189.  But see Steven A. Hammond, Note, The Art of Missed Opportunity—
How U.S. Courts Declined to Assist Private International Arbitral Tribunals under the U.S. 
Law Authorizing Discovery in Aid of Foreign and International Proceedings, 17 J. INT‘L 
ARB. 131, 137–43 (2000) (discussing why § 1782(a) should extend to international 
arbitration proceedings); see also Thurston K. Cromwell, Note, The Role of Federal Courts 
in Assisting International Arbitration:  National Broadcasting Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 
2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 177, 185–86 (suggesting that the Second Circuit interpreted  § 1782(a) 
too narrowly).  
 63. NBC, 165 F.3d at 189 (emphasis added). 
 64. Id.  But see In re Caratube Int‟l Oil Co., LLP, Misc. Action No. 10-0285 (JDB), 
2010 WL 3155822, at *4–6 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2010) (denying a request for discovery under 
§ 1782(a), even though the arbitration was a state-sponsored proceeding administered by 
ICSID pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty between the United States and Kazakhstan).  
 65. NBC, 165 F.3d at 190–91.  
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recognized that many benefits of arbitration, such as its cost-effectiveness, 
timeliness, and confidential nature, would be foregone if American-style 
discovery were permitted in private arbitration.66  The court further noted 
that while domestic arbitrations are deprived of extensive discovery, § 
1782(a) would allow foreign arbitration proceedings to have free use of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to obtain documents and take depositions 
of persons located in the United States.67 
The Fifth Circuit paralleled NBC‘s rationale in its interpretation of 
―international tribunal‖ under § 1782(a).68  In Republic of Kazakhstan v. 
Biedermann International,69 both parties were implicated in an arbitration 
proceeding before the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce.70  Kazakhstan requested that the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas compel a third-party to produce documents and 
submit a deposition for use in an arbitration proceeding.71  The district 
court granted Kazakhstan‘s request, but, on appeal, the Fifth Circuit 
reversed.72  Looking to the plain language of § 1782(a), the court found the 
statute to be inconclusive.73  The court then proceeded to examine the 
legislative history, noting that in 1964, when § 1782(a) was amended from 
―international courts‖ to ―international or foreign tribunals,‖ private 
international arbitration was a ―then-novel arena.‖74  The court concluded 
that it was highly unlikely that Congress intended to include a form of 
dispute resolution that was infrequently used at the time.75  The court also 
examined other statutory uses of the term ―tribunal,‖ finding that it was 
                                                          
 66. See id. (reasoning that ―[t]he popularity of arbitration rests in considerable part on 
its asserted efficiency and cost-effectiveness—characteristics said to be at odds with full-
scale litigation in the courts, and especially at odds with the broad-ranging discovery made 
possible by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.‖).   
 67. See id. at 191 (discussing the limitations on discovery imposed by § 7 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act that would be overridden if § 1782(a) was permitted for use in private 
international arbitration proceedings). 
 68. See Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int‘l, 168 F.3d 880, 882 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(―There is no contemporaneous evidence that Congress contemplated extending § 1782 to 
the then-novel arena of international commercial arbitration.  References in the United 
States Code to ‗arbitral tribunals‘ almost uniformly concern an adjunct of a foreign 
government or international agency.‖).  
 69. 168 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 1999).  
 70. Id. at 881.  
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. (―Having reviewed the parties‘ submissions and examined the language and 
history of § 1782, we elect to follow the Second Circuit‘s recent decision that           § 1782 
does not apply to private international arbitrations.‖).  
 73. Id. at 882.  
 74. See id. (discussing that the amendments broadened § 1782 to include only 
international ―government-sanctioned tribunals,‖ not private adjudicatory bodies).   
 75. Id.  For example, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has seen an 
increase in arbitrations from thirty-two arbitrations in 1956 to over five hundred in 2009.  
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:  COMMENTARY AND 
MATERIALS, 7 n.30 (2d ed. 2001); What is ICC?, INT‘L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 
http://iccwbo.org/id93/index.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).  
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used synonymously with governmental adjudicatory bodies.76  The court, 
therefore, concluded that private international arbitrations were not 
tribunals pursuant to § 1782(a).77  
B. Background and Summary of Intel  
In 2004 the Supreme Court interpreted § 1782(a) for the first time in 
deciding Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.78  Although the case 
did not concern an arbitration proceeding, district courts have applied its 
dicta and rationale to expand § 1782(a) to encompass arbitral tribunals.79  
Intel involved a discovery request in a U.S. district court for use in a 
proceeding before the state-sponsored Commission of the European 
Communities (―CEC‖).80  Advanced Micro Devices (―AMD‖) filed an 
antitrust complaint against Intel with the Directorate-General for 
Competition (―DG-Competition‖) alleging that Intel had abused its 
dominant position in the European market through anticompetitive 
practices.81  After filing its complaint with DG-Competition, AMD 
recommended that DG-Competition seek discovery of additional 
documents under court seal that Intel had provided in a previous U.S. 
antitrust suit.82  However, DG-Competition did not proceed on AMD‘s 
recommendation, and, consequently, AMD requested an order from the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California to compel Intel to 
produce the documents pursuant to  
§ 1782(a).83  
                                                          
 76. Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 882.  The court noted that the references to ―arbitral 
tribunals‖ in the United States Code almost uniformly referred to an adjunct of a foreign 
government.  See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 973n (2006) (establishing an arbitral tribunal by treaty 
and operating under the auspices of the U.S. government to resolve disputes with Pacific 
Island parties); 22 U.S.C. § 290k-11(a) (2006) (referring to arbitral tribunals established by 
treaty and operating between foreign entities).  
 77. Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 883.  Similarly to the Second Circuit, the court examined 
the policies behind arbitration as a ―speedy, economical, and effective means of dispute 
resolution‖ and articulated unease that ―arbitration‘s principal advantages may be destroyed 
if the parties succumb to fighting over burdensome discovery requests far from the place of 
arbitration.‖  Id.   
 78. 542 U.S. 241, 253 (2004). 
 79. See Losk, supra note 9, at 1038–39 (noting that the liberal reading of  
§ 1782(a) in Intel implicates NBC and requires additional examination of the precedent that 
excludes private international arbitral tribunals).  
 80. Intel, 542 U.S. at 246. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 250. 
 83. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., No.C-01-7033 MISC WAI, 2002 WL 
1339088, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2002), rev‟d 292 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2002), aff‟d 542 U.S. 
241 (2004).  In order to satisfy the requirements of § 1782, AMD argued that DG-
Competition performed similar functions as the Federal Trade Commission.  Id.  However, 
the CEC itself submitted a brief which stated that DG-Competition‘s procedures were 
―administrative and not judicial‖ and incomparable to the practices of the Federal Trade 
Commission.  Id. 
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The district court denied AMD‘s § 1782(a) request for discovery, 
reasoning that since DG-Competition was not an adjudicative body, it was 
not a ―tribunal‖ overseeing a ―proceeding‖ within the context of     § 
1782(a).84   
On AMD‘s appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that  
DG-Competition qualified as an ―international tribunal‖ pursuant to             
§ 1782(a).85  The court reasoned that because DG-Competition‘s final 
recommendations are adopted by the CEC, ―a body authorized to enforce 
the [C]EC Treaty with written, binding decisions, enforceable through fines 
and penalties,‖ and that because ―[C]EC decisions are appealable to the 
Court of First Instance and then the Court of Justice,‖ the requested 
discovery was for a proceeding ―leading to quasi-judicial proceedings.‖86  
The court further noted that ―allowance of liberal discovery seems entirely 
consistent with the twin aims of Section 1782:  providing efficient 
assistance to participants in international litigation and encouraging foreign 
countries by example to provide similar assistance to our courts.‖87 
The Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that  
DG-Competition was a ―tribunal‖ within the meaning of § 1782(a).88  The 
                                                          
 84. Id. at *2. In addition, the court noted DG-Competition‘s hostility towards receiving 
the requested documents for fear that their investigatory functions would be ―turned into a 
trial.‖ Id. at *1.  
 85. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d 664, 665, 668 (9th Cir. 
2002).  
 86. Id. at 667.  Additionally, the court held that § 1782(a) had no requirement for 
foreign discoverability, and therefore discovery requested under § 1782(a) was not obliged 
to be discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction.  Id. at 669.  The court examined the statute‘s 
language and the legislative history, finding no threshold requirement that the requesting 
party demonstrate that what is sought is discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction.  Id. at 668.  
Therefore, even though AMD was not permitted to request discovery under DG-
Competition regulations, AMD could nonetheless request discovery pursuant to § 1782(a).  
Id. at 668–69.  Cf. Philip W. Amram, Public Law No. 88-619 of October 3, 1964—New 
Developments in International Judicial Assistance in the United States of America, 32 J. 
BAR ASS‘N D.C. 24, 32 (1965) (discussing that in deciding whether to grant judicial 
assistance, the court ―may consider the nature and attitudes of the foreign government‖).  
Amram chaired the Advisory Committee to the Congressional Commission that presented 
the § 1782 amendments.  FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT ON THE COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL 
RULES OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-88, at viii (1963); accord Intel Corp. v. 
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 265–66 (2004) (noting that a court may deny 
a party‘s request for evidence if the party is trying to ―conceal an attempt to circumvent 
foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other polices of a foreign country or the United 
States‖).  
 87. Advanced Micro Devices, 292 F.3d at 669 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit 
applied an ―exclusive conduit‖ test; for a requesting party to satisfy the requirements of 
§ 1782, the proceeding for which the discovery is sought must be ―at minimum, one leading 
to quasi-judicial proceedings.‖  Id. at 667.    
 88. Intel, 542 U.S. at 251-254.  The Supreme Court deemed DG-Competition a tribunal 
even though the CEC filed amicus curiae briefs supporting Intel‘s opposition to the 
discovery request, stating that the DG-Competition was not a ―tribunal‖ for purposes of 
§ 1782.  See Brief of the Commission of the European Communities as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner, at 1–3, Intel, 542 U.S. 241 (No. 02-572), 2002 WL 32157391 at *1–3 
[hereinafter First CEC Brief].  The CEC further reasoned that the discovery AMD requested 
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Court held that even though DG-Competition was an investigatory body, its 
findings were reviewable by the European Courts, which were undeniably 
tribunals under § 1782(a).89  The Court observed that the investigatory 
stage was AMD‘s only opportunity to present potential evidence that would 
end up in those courts on a possible appeal, and therefore that admission of 
evidence at the complaint stage was the only way the documents could 
reach the judicial stage.90  Because DG-Competition acted as a first-
instance decision maker, capable of rendering a decision on the merits as 
part of a process that could ultimately lead to a final resolution of the 
dispute, the Court concluded that it was a ―tribunal‖ for the purposes of § 
1782(a) and that the discovery sought was ―for use‖ in an ―international or 
foreign tribunal.‖91  
In loosely defining the term ―international tribunal,‖ the Court implied 
that arbitration proceedings could also be considered ―tribunals‖ for the 
purpose of § 1782(a).92  The Court relied on the fact that in 1958, when 
Congress created the Commission on International Rules of Judicial 
Procedure, the Commission was required to recommend procedures that 
would permit judicial assistance to ―foreign courts and quasi-judicial 
agencies.‖93  In dicta, Justice Ginsburg quoted an article written by 
                                                          
was ―information that the Commission has thus far declined to seek on its own behalf,‖ and 
that ―[o]ther channels exist for the [CEC] . . . to obtain information located in the United 
States if the Commission considers it necessary . . . . It is the Commission‘s clear preference 
. . . to rely on the formal mechanisms that it has carefully negotiated with the United States 
specifically for . . . cooperation in competition law enforcement.‖  Brief of Amicus Curiae 
the Commission of the European Communities Supporting Reversal at 4, 8, Intel, 542 U.S. 
241 (No. 02-572), 2003 WL 23138389. at *3, *12 [hereinafter Second CEC Brief].  The 
CEC reiterated that ―this is a very serious matter‖ and cautioned that permitting 
complainants before the DG-Competition to use § 1782(a) to request discovery ―would be a 
breach of the principle of international comity.‖  First CEC Brief, at *4.  
 89. Intel contended that the DG-Competition was not a ―foreign or international 
tribunal‖ within the meaning of § 1782(a) since it was merely an investigatory body; 
however, the Court found it instructive that the DG-Competition‘s findings were reviewable 
by the Court of First Instance (CFI) or the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
(ECJ).  See Intel, 542 U.S. at 257-58.  
 90. See id.   
 91. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 246-47, 257-58.  Justice Breyer dissented, stating that courts 
should not grant a discovery request pursuant to § 1782(a) when the private person seeking 
the discovery would not be entitled to that discovery under foreign law, and the discovery 
would not be available under domestic law in analogous circumstances.  Id. at 270 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).  Justice Breyer also contended that the majority had 
extended § 1782‘s scope beyond what Congress had intended it to cover.  See id. at 267-68.  
As to whether DG-Competition was a ―tribunal‖ within the meaning of § 1782(a), Justice 
Breyer advocated that ―when a foreign entity possesses few tribunal-like characteristics, so 
that the applicability of the statute‘s word ‗tribunal‘ is in serious doubt, then a court should 
pay close attention to the foreign entity‘s own view of its ‗tribunal‘-like or non-‘tribunal‘-
like status.‖  Id. at 269.  
 92. Id. at 257–58 (majority opinion).  Although the NBC and Biedermann courts 
attempted to define ―tribunal‖ within § 1782(a), Intel relied solely on the fact that the 
legislative amendments continually broadened the scope of the statute.  See id.     
 93. Id.; see also BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1278-79 (8th ed. 2004) (―Quasi-judicial is a 
term that is . . . not easily definable. In the United States, the phrase often covers judicial 
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Professor Hans Smit which claimed that ―‗the term ―tribunal‖ . . . includes 
investigating magistrates, administrative and arbitral tribunals, and quasi-
judicial agencies, as well as conventional civil, commercial, criminal, and 
administrative courts.‘‖94  The Court concluded that because Congress had 
used Smit‘s article in the construction of the statute, they must have wanted 
―tribunal‖ to be construed broadly.95 
The Supreme Court laid out four factors for a district court to consider 
when determining whether a request for assistance should be granted.96  
First, a district court must examine whether the party requesting the 
discovery is a participant in the foreign or international tribunal.97  Second, 
a district court must determine the nature of the foreign tribunal, the 
character of the proceeding abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign 
government, court, or agency to the U.S. court assistance.98 Third, a district 
court must determine whether the § 1782(a) request conceals an attempt to 
circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of the 
foreign nation.99  Last, a district court must examine whether the request is 
unduly intrusive or burdensome.100  While the four factors may be 
instructive to lower courts, the Supreme Court did not indicate how to 
balance the factors or whether any of the factors were determinative.101   
C. Post-Intel Confusion Regarding Private International Arbitration 
Speculation grew after the Supreme Court‘s Intel decision as to whether 
§ 1782(a) would be available to parties participating in private international 
arbitration.
102
  Indeed, the reaction to the decision by lower courts has been 
                                                          
decisions taken by an administrative agency. . . .‖) (quoting GEORGE WHITECROSS PATON, A 
TEXTBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 336 (G.W. Paton & David P. Derham eds., 4th ed. 1972). 
However, the Court failed to recognize that even the reference to ―quasi-judicial‖ connotes 
some sort of government-sponsorship. See generally BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1121 (5th 
ed. 1979) (Quasi-judicial is ―a term applied to the action, discretion, etc. of public 
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the 
existence of facts, hold hearings and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their 
official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature‖) (emphasis added). 
 94. Intel, 542 U.S. at 258 (emphasis added) (quoting Smit, supra note 19, at 1026 n.71). 
 95. See id. at 258.  The Court also noted that § 1782(a) is permissive, and that courts 
may use their discretion when deciding whether to grant a discovery request.  Id. at 264. The 
Court remanded Intel to the lower court, to apply the Court‘s four-part analysis.  See id.  The 
lower court denied AMD‘s § 1782(a) request, concluding that the CEC had jurisdiction and 
therefore, U.S. judicial assistance was superfluous.  See Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. 
Intel Corp., No. C 01-7033, 2004 WL 2282320,  
at *1, *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2004).   
 96. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 264–66.  
 97. Id. at 264.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 264-65. 
 100. Id. at 265. 
 101. See id. at 264–65 (noting only that the listed factors ―bear consideration‖ in 
deciding a request to grant discovery under § 1782(a)).  
 102. See generally Barry H. Garfinkel & Yuval M. Miller, The Supreme Court‟s 
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mixed:  some lower courts have held that NBC and Biedermann are 
unaffected by the Supreme Court‘s dicta in Intel,103 while others have 
permitted requests for discovery for public and private international 
arbitration proceedings pursuant to    § 1782(a).104  Although the Supreme 
Court did not specifically address international arbitration, some lower 
courts interpreted Intel to permit the application of § 1782(a) in both public 
and private international arbitration.105 
1. In re Roz Trading Ltd. 
In Roz Trading,106 the Northern District of Georgia held that Intel 
provided ―sufficient guidance . . . to determine that arbitral panels . . . are 
‗tribunals‘ within the statute‘s scope.‖107  The dispute arose from a joint 
venture agreement between Roz Trading, the government of Uzbekistan, 
and the Coca-Cola Company.108  Roz Trading requested documents from 
the Coca-Cola Company for use in the international arbitration between 
Roz Trading and The Coca-Cola Export Company (―CCEC‖), a subsidiary 
of Coca-Cola, at the International Arbitral Centre before the Austrian 
Federal Economic Chamber (the ―Arbitral Centre‖).109  Coca-Cola 
contended that the Arbitral Centre was not a ‗tribunal‘ within the meaning 
of § 1782(a) because ―the [Arbitral] Centre is a private institution whose 
proceedings are voluntary. . . .‖110 
Using the factors established by Intel, the court determined that the 
Arbitral Centre was a tribunal for purposes of § 1782(a).111  The court 
reasoned that the Arbitral Centre, like the tribunal in Intel, acted as a 
                                                          
Reasoning in Intel Calls into Question Circuit Court Rulings on Inapplicability of 28 U.S. 
Code Section 1782 to International Arbitration, 19(8) INT‘L ARB. REPORT 25, 25-28 (2004) 
(discussing whether Intel would be dispositive for international arbitrations wanting to use § 
1782(a)).  
 103. See, e.g., La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelecctrica del Rio Lempa v. El Paso Corp., 
617 F. Supp. 2d 481, 485–87 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (holding that § 1782(a) does not extend to 
arbitral panels and that the Intel decision is not the controlling precedent for international 
arbitration panels), aff‟d 341 F. App‘x 31 (5th Cir.) (per curiam); see also In re Oxus Gold 
PLC, MISC No. 06-82-GEB, 2007 WL 1037387,  
at *4–5 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2007) (following the rationale from Intel and permitting a discovery 
request pursuant to § 1782(a), however reasoning that the proceeding concerned a public-
governmental arbitral body pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty, not a private arbitration 
like NBC or Biedermann). 
 104. See infra notes 106-141 and accompanying text (discussing post-Intel cases 
permitting the use of § 1782(a) in arbitration proceedings).  
 105. See infra notes 106­141 and accompanying text (detailing courts‘ struggle to 
ascertain whether they should look to Intel in granting requests under § 1782(a) when the 
parties are involved in arbitration proceedings). 
 106. In re Roz Trading Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
 107. Id. at 1224. 
 108. Id. at 1222-23. 
 109. Id. at 1222.  
 110. Id. at 1224.  
 111. See id. at 1224-25.   
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―‗first-instance decision-maker that issue[d] decisions ‗both responsive to 
the complaint and reviewable in court.‘‖112  
In addition, the Roz Trading court found the language of § 1782(a) 
unambiguous and contended that the term ―tribunal‖ was widely 
recognized to include arbitration proceedings.113  The court further 
reasoned that the underlying purpose for the 1964 amendments was to 
broaden the scope of the proceedings under § 1782(a).114  Although the 
court noted that Intel did not precisely address ―whether private arbitral 
panels [were] ‗tribunals,‘‖ it concluded that since the Arbitral Centre had 
the authority to render a decision on the merits, ―as part of the process that 
could ultimately lead to final resolution of the dispute,‖ the Arbitral Centre 
was a ―tribunal‖ pursuant to § 1782(a).115 
2. In re Hallmark Capital Corp. 
The court in Hallmark focused on Intel‘s broad interpretation of         § 
1782(a).116  Hallmark had initiated a private arbitration in Israel against 
                                                          
 112. Id. at 1225. (quoting Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 
255 (2004)).  The court failed to discuss whether the reviewing courts would be able to take 
their own evidence, or, as a deciding factor in Intel, be limited to the evidence obtained by 
the first-instance decision maker.  See id.  In addition, a key characteristic of arbitration is 
that the decisions are binding and the merits of the decision are usually unreviewable by the 
national courts unless there is fraud, corruption, partiality, or misconduct.  See, e.g., 9 
U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (―To prevail on a claim of fraud or undue means under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, a party must show:  (1) existence of fraud by clear and convincing 
evidence; (2) the fraud was not discoverable through due diligence prior to or during the 
arbitration proceeding; and (3) the fraud materially related to an issue in the arbitration‖); 
see also  
THE FRENCH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ENGLISH 328 (Nicolas Brooke trans., 2009)  
(―An appeal against the decision which grants recognition or enforcement of an award is 
only available in the following cases:  1) Where the arbitrator has ruled upon the matter 
without any arbitration agreement or where this agreement is invalid or has expired; 2) 
Where the arbitral tribunal has been invalidly constituted or the sole arbitrator irregularly 
appointed; 3) Where the arbitrator has made a ruling that is not in accordance with the task 
conferred upon him; 4) Where the principle of involving all the parties has not been 
complied with; [and] 5) If the recognition or enforcement is contrary to international public 
policy.‖).  
 113. See Roz Trading Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 2d at 1226 (―In the absence of ambiguity, it 
would be improper for the Court to consider legislative history or impose its own limitations 
upon the meaning of the statute‘s terms.‖) (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 
587 (1981))).  The court also noted that ―[h]ad Congress wanted to impose the limitation 
advanced by [the party opposing extension of § 1782 to private arbitration bodies], it would 
have been a simple matter to add the word ‗governmental‘ before the word ‗tribunal‘ in the 
1964 amendment.‖  Roz Trading, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 1226 n.3.  
 114. See id. at 1226.  
 115. See id. at 1224 (―Although Intel did not expressly hold arbitral bodies to be 
‗tribunals,‘ it quoted approvingly language that included ‗arbitral tribunals‘ within the 
term‘s meaning in § 1782(a)‖).  The court further contended that Intel‟s holding had 
―materially impacted‖ the decisions in NBC and Biedermann.  Id. at 1226.  
 116. See In re Hallmark Capital Corp., 534 F. Supp. 2d 951, 956 (D. Minn. 2007); 
Jessica Weekley, Comment, Discovering Discretion:  Applying Intel to § 1782 Requests for 
Discovery in Arbitration, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 535, 543 (2009) (noting that while the 
Roz Trading court relied on Intel and examined the plain language of § 1782, the Hallmark 
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UltraShape Inc.,117 and sought discovery from UltraShape‘s non-party 
Chairman pursuant to § 1782(a).118  Citing Roz Trading, the court granted 
Hallmark‘s request, reasoning that the ―common usage‖ and ―widely 
accepted definition‖ of the term ―tribunal‖ included private international 
arbitration panels.119  As in Roz Trading, the court in Hallmark 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court had not specifically addressed 
private international arbitration, but nonetheless reasoned that: 
any lack of a clear holding from the Supreme Court on this issue is of 
little moment because the Court‘s general approach to Section 1782, as 
well as that statute‘s legislative history, makes clear that the statute is 
best read not to impose any restrictive definitional exclusions that would 
necessarily preclude assistance to all private arbitral bodies.
120
 
The court noted that because Intel did not limit the ―interested persons‖ 
requirement in § 1782(a) to ―private ‗litigants‘ or sovereign agents,‖ the 
Supreme Court‘s expansive approach indicated that private arbitrations 
should be considered ―tribunals.‖121  Additionally, the court looked to the 
Intel factors, noting that the Israeli arbitrator ―ha[d] expressly indicated his 
willingness to consider any evidence that results from the requested 
discovery.‖122  The court concluded that based on the Intel factors and the 
broad construction of the statute, private international arbitration 
proceedings were ―tribunals‖ pursuant to § 1782(a).123 
3. In re Oxus Gold PLC 
The court in Oxus took a different approach.124  The dispute arose 
between Oxus Gold PLC, an international mining group from the United 
Kingdom, and the Kyrgyz Republic.125  The Kyrgyz government had 
                                                          
court focused mainly on the holding of Intel). 
 117. In re Hallmark, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 953.  
 118. Id.    
 119. See id. at 954.  The court noted that § 1782 did not define ‗tribunal‘ and used the 
Black‘s Law Dictionary definition of ―[a] court or other adjudicatory body.‖   
See id. (quoting BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1512 (7th ed. 1999)). 
 120. Id. at 955.  See generally Daniel J. Rothstein, A Proposal to Clarify U.S. Law on 
Judicial Assistance in Taking Evidence for International Arbitration, 19 AM. REV. INT‘L 
ARB. 61, 66 (2008) (discussing how Intel‘s mere mention of ―arbitral tribunals‖ has lead 
four courts to conclude that § 1782 includes private international arbitration). 
 121. See In re Hallmark, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 955.  
 122. Id. at 958; see Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264 
(2004) (noting that when granting a request for discovery, one factor to consider is the 
―receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal-court 
judicial assistance.‖). 
 123. In re Hallmark, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 955-58.  
 124. See In re Oxus Gold PLC, MISC No. 06-82-GEB, 2007 WL 1037387, at *1 (D.N.J. 
Apr. 2, 2007).  Instead of contradicting the Second and Fifth circuits, the court distinguished 
Intel, holding that public international arbitrations are included under    § 1782(a). See id. at 
*5. 
 125. Id. at *1.  
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granted licenses to Oxus Gold and the State of Kyrgyz to form a joint 
venture for the development of gold deposits.126  When the license was 
revoked, Oxus Gold initiated arbitration proceedings against Kyrgyzstan 
for unlawful and discriminatory conduct in violation of the UK-Kyrgyz 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (―BIT‖).127  Oxus Gold proceeded to request 
documents and testimony from a nonparticipant to the arbitration who was 
located in the United States pursuant to       § 1782(a).128  Although the 
district court permitted the request for evidence, it did not specifically 
apply Intel‘s ―tribunal analysis‖ of a first-instance decision maker or close 
resemblance to an adjudicatory agency.129  Conversely, the court 
distinguished the Second and Fifth circuits, noting that Oxus involved a 
public international arbitration pursuant to a state-sponsored BIT, whereas 
the other circuits had merely excluded private international arbitration.130  
The court reasoned that although the arbitration was undoubtedly between 
two private litigants, because the arbitration was being administered under 
UNCITRAL rules pursuant to the BIT Agreement, it was ―thus being 
conducted within a framework defined by two nations‖ and constituted a 
―tribunal‖ pursuant to § 1782(a).131 Although the court did not adopt the 
framework established in Intel, it used the broad interpretation of the term 
―tribunal‖ to grant the discovery request pursuant to the government-
sponsored arbitral proceeding.132 
4. La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelecctrica del Rio Lempa v. El Paso 
Corp. 
A more recent decision concerning the terms ―international tribunal‖ 
within the meaning of § 1782(a) was decided in the Southern District of 
                                                          
 126. Id.  
 127. Id.  See generally John Fellas, Using Section 1782 in International Arbitration,  
23 ARB. INT‘L 379, 396 (2007) (discussing the significance of the agreement to be bound by 
a bilateral investment treaty).  
 128. In re Oxus Gold, 2007 WL 1037387, at *2.  Oxus Gold filed an ex parte application 
for documents and testimony from Jack A. Barbanel, who likely possessed evidence and 
who was ―found‖ within the district of New Jersey pursuant to the requirements of § 1782.  
See id. at *2-4. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. at *5 (distinguishing the arbitral proceedings pursuant to a BIT from the 
private tribunals at issue in NBC and Biedermann); see also Fellas, supra note 127, at 396 
(noting that the court distinguished Oxus Gold on the grounds that the arbitration proceeding 
was established by a governmental body and therefore it was not a private international 
arbitration). 
 131. In re Oxus Gold, 2007 WL 1037387, at *5.  (―Article 8 of the [BIT] Agreement 
between the United Kingdom and Kazakhstan specifically mandate[d] that disputes between 
nationals of the two countries would be resolved by arbitration governed by international 
law.‖). 
 132. Id.  The court did not address whether § 1782 was available for private international 
arbitrations and that question remains unanswered in the Third Circuit.  See id.  
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Texas.133  In El Paso Corp., the dispute between Nejapa Power Co. L.L.C. 
and Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelecctrica (―CEL‖), a company controlled by 
the government of El Salvador, was being privately arbitrated pursuant to 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.134  CEL requested discovery pursuant to 
§ 1782(a) to obtain documents from a non-party located in the United 
States for use in the arbitration proceedings.135 
Although the court initially granted the request for discovery, the 
arbitration panel in Geneva, Switzerland issued procedural orders in 
opposition of the requested discovery.136  The arbitral panel expressed 
concern that CEL‘s discovery request was ―unwarranted in view of the 
parties‘ choice of international arbitration and the procedure [for the 
production of documents] established by the Arbitral Tribunal in the 
present proceedings.‖137  Further, it was only after the Arbitral Panel had 
determined the arbitration procedures, including discovery limitations, that 
CEL requested discovery pursuant to  
§ 1782(a).138  
Ultimately the Southern District of Texas did not grant CEL‘s discovery 
request.139  The court distinguished the ongoing arbitral proceeding from 
the tribunal in Intel, noting that ―[a]n arbitral tribunal exists as a parallel 
source of decision-making to, and is entirely separate from, the judiciary, 
which was not the case with the DG Competition as the Court was at pains 
to point out in Intel.‖140  The court further criticized the lower courts that 
had construed  
§ 1782(a) to apply to private arbitration panels, concluding ―[u]ntil, and, if, 
the Supreme Court itself adopts Hans Smit‘s statements as its own within 
the text of the opinion itself, Hans Smit‘s opinions on arbitral tribunals has 
no more weight and authority than any other scholarly article.‖141 
                                                          
 133. La Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelecctrica del Rio Lempa v. El Paso Corp.,  
617 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D. Tex. 2008).  
 134. Id. at 483-84. Unlike the public investment arbitration established between the 
governments in Oxus Gold, this case concerned two private parties who had agreed to have 
their disputed arbitrated under the UNCITRAL rules, without the mandate of a BIT.  See id. 
at 483. 
 135. El Paso Corp.‘s Motion for Reconsideration at 1, El Paso Corp., 617 F. Supp. 2d 
481 (No. 4:08-mc-00335), 2008 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 74188 at *1.  
 136. Id.  Similar to the Amicus filed by the DG-Competition in Intel, the arbitration 
panel expressed its opposition to costly American-style discovery for obtaining evidence in 
the arbitration proceeding.  Second CEC Brief, supra note 88, at *12–13 (stating that 
permitting parties to use § 1782(a) for American-style discovery would burden their agency 
and hinder their investigations). 
 137. El Paso Corp.‘s Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 135, at *5 (quoting 
Procedural Order No. 3 ¶ 37).  
 138. Id. at *4.  
 139. El Paso Corp., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 482.  
 140. Id. at 485-86.  
 141. Id. at 486.  See generally State v. Jackson, 546 S.E.2d 570, 573 (N.C. 2001) 
(―[G]eneral expressions in every opinion are to be taken in connection with the case in 
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III. PROPER INTERPRETATION OF INTEL AND ―FOREIGN TRIBUNALS‖  
Congress intended for courts to interpret the term ―international tribunal‖ 
to apply exclusively to governmental adjudicatory bodies.  Section 1782(a) 
offers no statutory authority to grant discovery requests for private 
international arbitration proceedings.142  Further, the legislative history 
does not indicate Congressional intent to include private international 
arbitration pursuant to § 1782(a).143  Consequently, while Congress 
broadened the scope of the statute through the 1964 amendments, it used 
the term ―tribunals‖ solely in the context of governmental adjudicatory 
bodies.144   
Moreover, the Intel decision is not dispositive of the issue because the 
Supreme Court did not directly address whether § 1782(a) could be used 
for private international arbitration.145  Therefore, in order to maintain the 
cost and efficiency benefits of using private international arbitration, Intel‘s 
rationale should be limited to circumstances involving governmental 
adjudicatory bodies.146  
A. Statutory Language of § 1782(a) Does Not Enumerate Private 
International Arbitration Proceedings as “International Tribunals”  
The Supreme Court established that legislative interpretation must begin 
with an examination of the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, 
by referring to ―the language itself, the specific context in which that 
                                                          
which those expressions are used.  If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but 
ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit where the very point is presented for 
decision.‖) (quoting Moose v. Bd. of Comm‘rs, 90 S.E. 441, 448-49 (N.C. 1916)).  
 142. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text 
(suggesting that there is no statutory authority to grant assistance to private international 
arbitration tribunals). 
 143. See NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 1999) (―[L]egislative 
history‘s silence with respect to private tribunals is especially telling because we are 
confident that a significant congressional expansion of American judicial assistance to 
international arbitral panels created exclusively by private parties would not have been 
lightly undertaken by Congress without at least a mention of this legislative intention.‖). 
 144. See id. 
 145. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (asserting that the Intel decision did not 
specifically address arbitration).  
 146. See Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., U.S. Courts Expand Discovery in International 
Arbitration, 2007 INT‘L ARB. REPORT, May 2007, at 1, 3, available at 
http://www.fulbright.com/images/publications/09102007ARIssue2.pdf (noting that although 
citation to Professor Hans Smit‘s article was dicta, Justice Ginsburg‘s reference presents the 
possibility of extending the reach of § 1782(a) far beyond its intended application).  But see 
Hans Smit, The Supreme Court Rules on the Proper Interpretation of Section 1782:  Its 
Potential Significance for International Arbitration,  
14 AM. REV. INT‘L ARB. 295, 298 (2003).  Upon the Supreme Court‘s grant of certiorari to 
the Intel case, Professor Smit asserted ―I also hope that the Supreme Court may find it 
appropriate to reject the now unanimous, but clearly incorrect, view of two appellate courts 
that Section 1782 does not extend its reach to private international arbitral tribunals.‖  Id. 
JENNA GODFREY 60.2 
498 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:475 
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.‖147  The 
inquiry ends ―if the language is clear and ‗the statutory scheme is coherent 
and consistent.‘‖148  
The disputed terms read in relevant part:  ―[t]he district court of the 
district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his 
testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a 
proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal 
investigations . . . .‖149  Since ―foreign or international tribunal‖ is 
undefined in § 1782(a), the plain language of the words must be given their 
ordinary or natural meaning.150  The ordinary meaning of the words 
controls unless a literal application of the statute would produce results 
contrary to the statutory purpose.151  
However, as the court in NBC pointed out, the plain meaning of the word 
―tribunal‖ is unclear because ―tribunal‖ has several definitions.152  The term 
―tribunal‖ may refer to the physical seat or platform on which a judge 
                                                          
 147. Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Robinson v. 
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)); see, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices 
Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 255 (2004) (―[I]n all statutory construction cases, we begin [our 
examination of § 1782] with the language of the statute.‖ (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal 
Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002))); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 
(1989) (holding that the plain meaning of the statute is decisive ―except in the ‗rare cases [in 
which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the 
intentions of [the] drafters‘‖ (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 
571 (1982))).  
 148. Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1295 (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340); see also Negonsott 
v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993) (―Our task is to give effect to the will of Congress, and 
where its will has been expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily 
be regarded as conclusive.‖) (quoting Griffin, 458 U.S. at 570). 
 149. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 150. See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (discussing that when a statute 
does not define a word, it should be construed in accordance with its natural or plain 
meaning) (citing Smith v. United States 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993));  
accord Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144-46 (1995) (reasoning that absent some 
indication that Congress intended to use a term of art, the ordinary or natural meaning must 
be given to the word). 
 151. See Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571 (noting that courts must avoid statutory interpretations 
that would produce bizarre results).   
 152. See NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1999) (―In our view, 
the term ‗foreign or international tribunal‘ is sufficiently ambiguous that it does not 
necessarily include or exclude the arbitral panel at issue here.‖); see also Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro 
Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004) (No. 02-572), 2004 WL 214306 at *14 (citing 
WEBSTER‘S THIRD NEW INT‘L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 2441 
(Philip Babcock Gove et al. eds., 1993)) (contending that a ―tribunal‖ can mean  
―a court of forum of justice‖ or ―something that decides or judges‖); cf. Graham Cnty. Soil 
& Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 130 S. Ct. 1396, 1405–06 
(2010) (discussing that the term ―administrative‖ may in various contexts have different 
meanings pertaining to private and governmental bodies).  See generally Lawrence M. 
Solan, The New Textualists‟ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027, 2048 (2005) (noting that 
when trying to decipher the ordinary meaning of a word within a statute a problem that 
arises ―is that courts find ordinary meaning anywhere they look and judges are not 
restrained in deciding where they are willing to look‖). 
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sits.153  Webster‘s Dictionary references ―the Supreme Court [as] the 
highest [tribunal] of the United States.‖154  The colloquial meaning of the 
word, meanwhile, refers to ―something that has the power to determine or 
judge.‖155  Yet there is no evidence that Congress elected to use these 
uncommonly broad constructions of the term.156  Because Congress merged 
two ―threads‖ of legislation to create a comprehensive statute concerning 
judicial assistance to foreign sovereign adjudicatory bodies, it is unlikely 
that it intended to assist all of the forms of dispute resolution encompassed 
by this broad definition.157  
In In re Medway Power,158 the court examined the Webster‘s dictionary 
definition of ―tribunal,‖ observing that private arbitration is generally not 
                                                          
 153. See, e.g., BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1506 (6th ed. 1990) (defining ‗tribunal‘ as 
―[t]he seat of a judge; a court of law; the place where he administers justice.  The whole 
body of judges who compose a jurisdiction; a judicial court; the jurisdiction which the 
judges exercise.‖); WEBSTER‘S THIRD NEW INT‘L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
UNABRIDGED 2441 (Philip Babcock Gove et al. eds., 1976) (―seat of a judge or one acting as 
a judge‖); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1369 
(William Morris ed., 1969) (defining ‗tribunal‘ as ―[t]he platform or seat on which a judge 
or other presiding officer sits in court.‖); THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 2019 (2d ed. 1987) (―a place or seat of judgment.‖).  
 154. WEBSTER‘S, supra note 153, at 2441.  Under this definition, private international 
arbitration would not be considered a ―tribunal‖ because it is a private adjudicatory body 
outside the national courts.  Id.   
 155. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1909 (3d ed. 
1992).  However this definition is uncommonly used and therefore not recognized by most 
unabridged dictionaries.  See, e.g., BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 153 (defining 
tribunal as ―The seat of a judge; a court of law; the place where he administers justice.  The 
whole body of judges who compose a jurisdiction; a judicial court; the jurisdiction which 
the judges exercise.‖).  
 156. See, e.g., Office Max, Inc. v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 2d 984, 995 (N.D. Ohio 
2004) (discussing that while a word may have several meanings, construing it to utilize the 
uncommon usage is improper for statutory interpretation), aff‟d, 428 F.3d 583 (6th Cir. 
2005); see also supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (discussing other statutory uses of 
―tribunal‖ in reference to governmental bodies).  
 157. Act of July 3, 1930, ch. 851, 46 Stat. 1005-1006, amended by Act of June 7, 1933, 
ch. 50, 48 Stat. 117-118 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 270-270g (2006) (granting 
federal courts power to assist in foreign tribunals between the United States and foreign 
governments to which the United States was a party).  These blended statutes were repealed 
by the Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619,  
78 Stat. 995 and replaced in the same act by 78 Stat. 997, which granted federal courts 
authority to assist in foreign proceedings to which the United States was not a party.  See 28 
U.S.C.   § 1782(a) (2006); see also Committee on International Commercial Disputes, 28 
U.S.C.  § 1782 As a Means of Obtaining Discovery in Aid of International Commercial 
Arbitration—Applicability and Best Practices, 63 REC. B. ASS‘N. OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 752, 
760-64 (2008) (discussing how the amendments of 1964 consolidated two statutes:  § 1782, 
which provided judicial assistance to ―foreign courts;‖ and §§ 270-270g of Title 22, which 
permitted federal courts to assist in foreign tribunals between the United States and foreign 
governments to which the United States was a party).  In addition, it is difficult to construe § 
1782(a) to encompass all forms of dispute resolution when in 1996 Congress specifically 
amended the statute to include criminal investigations.  National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 1342, 110 Stat. 486.  Although the text is 
identical to the 1964 statute, ―including criminal investigations conducted before formal 
accusation,‖ was added to the first sentence in 1996.  Id.   
 158. In re Medway Power Ltd., 985 F. Supp. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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referred to as a tribunal.159  The court noted that although arbitration 
proceedings may be casually referred to as ―tribunals,‖ they are not 
intended to be included in the formal sense under § 1782(a).160  The court 
further reasoned that merely because the term ―tribunal‖ can include 
private arbitration panels, it does not necessarily follow that the term as 
used in § 1782(a) encompasses private arbitration proceedings.161   
While referring to a dictionary definition may be helpful, it is not 
sufficient for determining the meaning of a word in a statute.162   
As noted in Intel,163 it is important to look at the legislative history and the 
statutory scheme to determine if Congress made further attempts to define 
the disputed terms.164   
B. Legislative History Did Not Include Private  
International Arbitration Pursuant to § 1782(a) 
Although Congressional amendments have continued to broaden      § 
1782(a), there is no indication that Congress intended to extend the statute 
to include private international arbitration.165   
                                                          
 159. See id. at 403 (noting that a ―Bet Din‖ (a Jewish religious court) could be referred to 
as a tribunal, however they would not be considered tribunals in the formal sense nor 
pursuant to § 1782(a)). 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id.; see NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing 
that while § 1782 does not expressly prohibit private international arbitration, it also does 
not expressly include it within the statute); cf. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341-
42 (1997) (noting that the term ―employees‖ was general enough to include former 
employees and that Congress did not expressly specify ―current employees‖ making the 
terminology in the statute ambiguous). 
 162. See Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) (―[I]t is one of the surest 
indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the 
dictionary‖), aff‟d, 326 U.S. 404 (1945); see also Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 
(1994) (―[a]mbiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context‖).  
 163. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 255-56 (2004). 
 164. See, e.g., Castellano v. New York City Fire Dep‘t Pension Fund, 142 F.3d 58, 67 
(2d Cir. 1998) (―Where the language is ambiguous, we focus upon the ‗broader context‘ and 
‗primary purpose‘ of the statute.‖); Garza v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 91, 96 (Cust. Ct. 
1971) (―The courts are bound to determine the intent of Congress by the language which 
was actually used and have no right to give any meaning to such language other than that 
conveyed by the words in which the legislative will was expressed.‖); see also Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n of the U.S., Inc. v. New York State Dep‘t of Envtl. Conservation, 17 
F.3d 521, 531 (2d Cir. 1994) (―[W]here ambiguity resides in a statute, legislative history and 
other tools of interpretation may be employed to determine legislative purpose more 
perfectly.‖).  While some judges and commentators oppose the use of legislative history, 
many appreciate its usefulness in discerning the meaning of a statute.  See, e.g., John F. 
Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2389 (2003) (supporting the 
use of legislative history to decipher a statute due to the fact that ―Congress does not always 
accurately reduce its intentions to words‖ and ―because legislators necessarily draft statutes 
within the constraints of bounded foresight, limited resources, and imperfect language‖).  
 165. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 190 (noting that Congress‘s silence regarding private 
international arbitration may indicate that Congress did not intend to extend the statute to 
this form of private dispute resolution).   
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As illustrated by the court in NBC, the amendments lend greater support for 
the claim that international arbitration was excluded from § 1782(a).166   
The 1964 amendments of § 1782(a) resulted in the merging of two 
different methods for foreign sovereign adjudicatory bodies to obtain 
judicial assistance from U.S. district courts.167  The two threads of 
legislation combined the 1930 enactment of 22 U.S.C. §§ 270-270g, which 
permitted the gathering of evidence in the United States for claims being 
adjudicated in international tribunals sponsored by sovereign states,168 and 
the Act of May 24, 1949, which aimed to provide judicial assistance in 
gathering evidence for litigation in foreign courts.169  
Sections 270-270c were enacted to assist governmental adjudicatory 
bodies.170  These sections were passed in response to complications that 
occurred during arbitration proceedings between the United States and 
Canada.171  Further, §§ 270d-270g were passed to assist proceedings 
between the United States and the German Mixed Claims Commission.172  
                                                          
 166. See id.  (asserting that the consolidation of 22 U.S.C. §§ 270-270g, which confers 
powers on commissioners or members of ―international tribunals‖ in which the United 
States is a party, and 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), which permits non-state parties to request 
discovery, still assumes use only by governmental proceedings); see also Republic of 
Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int‘l, 168 F.3d 880, 881-82 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that the 
statutory history demonstrates that Congress intended to broaden the scope for international 
government-sanctioned tribunals). 
 167. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 189 (noting that the House and Senate committee reports 
indicate that the use of the word tribunal ―[f]or example . . . is intended [so] that the court[s] 
have discretion to grant assistance when proceedings are pending before investigation 
magistrates in foreign countries‖ (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 88-1052, at 9 (1963), reprinted in 
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788)).  See generally Committee on International Commercial 
Disputes, supra note 157, at 754–61 (discussing the state-sponsored tribunals leading to the 
merger of the two judicial assistance statues).    
 168. See Act of July 3, 1930, §§ 1–4, ch. 851, 46 Stat. 1005, 1005–06, amended by Act 
of June 7, 1933, §§ 5–8, ch. 50, 48 Stat. 117, 117–18 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. 
§§ 270270(g) (2006)) repealed by Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, § 3, 78 Stat. 
995; see also Smit, supra note 47, at 1266 n.17, 1269 n.30, 1270 n.31, 1271 n.35, 1273-74 
n.48, 1275 n.52 (highlighting the text of the now-repealed 22 U.S.C.  
§§ 270-270(g)). 
 169. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, 63 Stat. 103.   
 170. See Committee on International Commercial Disputes, supra note 157, at 755–57 
(discussing the history of § 1782 and its roots grounded in foreign-state litigation).   
 171. Smit, supra note 47, at 1264.  During arbitration proceedings between the United 
States and Canada concerning the sinking of the vessel I‘m Alone, there was no available 
device to compel the testimony of witnesses.  Id.  As a result, Congress, at the initiation of 
Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, adopted a law ―authorizing commissioners or members 
of international tribunals to administer oaths, to subpoena witnesses and records, and to 
punish for contempt.‖  Id.  
 172. Id. at 1264, 1269 (noting that the statute applied only to international tribunals 
―established pursuant to an agreement between the United States and any foreign 
government.‖).  In the United States-German Mixed Claims Commission, a German agent 
successfully contended that the powers granted by the law could not be invoked since they 
exceeded the agreement under the treaty creating the Commission.  Id. at 1264.  Congress 
enacted an additional statute to avoid future complications.  Id.   
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As observed by the court in NBC, both of these statutory provisions were 
clearly directed at state-sponsored courts:  Canada and Germany.173   
Both the Fifth and Second Circuits concluded that the merger of these 
provisions into § 1782(a) was meant to assist procedures for obtaining 
evidence before foreign government-sponsored adjudicatory bodies, not 
private international arbitration proceedings.174  Although the amendments 
eliminated the requirement that sovereigns be a party to the proceeding, the 
requirement that sovereigns sponsor the proceeding in order to obtain 
judicial assistance remained in effect.175  
In addition, Congress‘s only attempt to further clarify the meaning of 
―tribunal‖ in § 1782(a) was the 1996 amendment, which introduced 
criminal investigations as ―tribunals‖ pursuant to the statute.176  As the 
court in NBC noted, if Congress had intended to extend ―tribunal‖ beyond 
government-sponsored bodies, they would have amended the statute as was 
done in the 1996 amendment.177   
Finally, for legislative history to be useful for statutory interpretation, it 
must be examined from the time of the statute‘s enactment to be relevant in 
deciphering the meaning of a statute.178  As the Biedermann court noted, 
when § 1782(a) was enacted, private international arbitration was a ―novel 
                                                          
 173. See NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 189 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that the 
term ―international tribunal‖ derives directly from §§ 270-270g, which only applied to 
intergovernmental tribunals); see also Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int‘l, 168 
F.3d 880, 882 (5th Cir. 1999) (discussing that the revised version of § 1782 combined other 
statutes which facilitated discovery only for international governmental tribunals).  
 174. See NBC, 165 F.3d at 189 (discussing that in context of the revisions, the drafters 
only contemplated ―governmental entities, such as administrative or investigative courts, 
acting as state instrumentalities or with the authority of the state.‖).  The House and Senate 
reports state that the 1964 amendments to § 1782 would assist obtaining evidence ―before a 
foreign administrative tribunal or quasi-judicial agency.‖  See H.R. REP. NO. 88-1052, at 9 
(1963); S. REP. NO. 88-1580 at 9 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788.  
Neither of these reports refer to private dispute resolution proceedings such as arbitration, 
suggesting that Congress did not contemplate including them within the statute.  See id.  
 175. See Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 882 (―References in the United States Code to ‗arbitral 
tribunals‘ almost uniformly concern an adjunct of a foreign government or international 
agency.‖).  
 176. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 
Stat. 186, 486 (1996).  This amendment was merely a codification of common practice 
among the federal courts.  See generally Hans Smit, The Supreme Court Rules on the 
Proper Interpretation of Section 1782:  It‟s Potential Significance for International 
Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT‘L ARB. 295, n. 17 (2003) (discussing federal courts that 
permitted foreign criminal investigations to utilize § 1782 before the 1996 amendments 
which specifically added‖ criminal investigations‖). 
 177. NBC, 165 F.3d at 190.  See generally Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank 
of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 186 (1994) (citation omitted) (―Congressional inaction cannot 
amend a duly enacted statute.‖).   
 178. See, e.g., Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. 
Wilson, 130 S. Ct. 1396, 1409 (noting that letters written by individual legislators thirteen 
years after enactment of legislation that they had sponsored, regarding the meaning of this 
legislation, ―[did] not qualify as legislative ‗history,‘‖ and was ―of scant or no value‖ in 
construing it).  
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arena.‖179  Although at present private international arbitration is a widely 
accepted method of dispute resolution, historically it was regarded with 
great suspicion by the courts and the federal government.180  Many U.S. 
courts felt that arbitration was an inadequate alternative to litigation for 
resolving disputes.181  While the federal government currently projects a 
pro-arbitration policy, favoring arbitration agreements to be construed 
liberally, the legislative history of § 1782(a) must be evaluated in the 
context of its enactment.182  Therefore, because the United States was 
uncertain of the adequacy of private international arbitrations when the 
statute was enacted, Congress did not include it within                       § 
1782(a).183  
C. The Statutory Scheme References Government-Sponsored Tribunals 
When evaluating the meaning of a word in a statute, it is also important 
to evaluate the statutory scheme in which the word appears.184  When the 
Second Circuit examined the significance of the statutory scheme of § 
1782(a), it found that expanding the statute to private international 
arbitration ignored not only the purpose behind its enactment, but also the 
                                                          
 179. Biedermann, 168 F.3d at 882.  
 180. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1984) (discussing the 
common law hostility towards arbitration); Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427, 431–32 (1953) 
(explaining that arbitration was not preferable to litigation in cases pursuing statutory 
enforcement due to the inferiority of arbitration proceedings); cf. Lawrence S. Schaner & 
John R. Schleppenbach, Looking Back at 2007:  Another Good Year in the Enforcement of 
International Arbitral Awards in the US, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 80, 80 (2008) (―In 2007, the 
parties challenging enforcement were remarkably unsuccessful. U.S. district courts 
confirmed international arbitration awards almost across the board.‖). 
 181. See generally Kenneth F. Dunham, Southland Corp. v. Keating Revisited:  Twenty-
Five Years in Which Direction?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 331, 343 (2010) (discussing the 
historical ―inferiority of process attitude‖ taken by the U.S. judiciary towards arbitration); 
see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57–58 (1974) (noting that 
arbitration, when compared to federal courts, generates an incomplete record, is not 
governed by evidentiary rules, and may lack many of the safeguards provided by discovery).  
 182. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479–80 
(1989) (discussing traditional hostility to arbitration and current pro-arbitration policy 
reflected by the Arbitration Act).  
 183. Although there was generally hostility towards arbitration, Congress did enact 
legislation specific to arbitral proceedings during this time.  See, e.g., United States 
Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 
(2006)), Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 670 (1947).  
 184. See generally Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 130 
S.Ct. 1396, 1404 (2010) (―Courts have a ‗duty to construe statutes, not isolated statutory 
provisions‘‖ (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 568 (1995)).  The court must 
consider not only the plain meaning of the word, but also its placement within the statutory 
scheme.  See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (―‗The meaning of statutory 
language, plain or not, depends on context‘‖ (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 
(1994))); see also Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 1998) (―Where 
the language is ambiguous, we focus upon the ‗broader context‘ and ‗primary purpose‘ of 
the statute.‖ (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 345 (1997))). 
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statutory scheme in which it was found.185  Additionally, the NBC court 
found the use of ―international or foreign tribunal‖ in the other amendments 
further clarified the scope of the statute.186   
Section 1782 and ten other amendments were part of a bill from the 
Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure.187   
As noted earlier, the Commission was established to study the federal and 
state statutes and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure utilized in practice 
in international litigation.188  However, the creation of the Commission 
provides no evidence that it was meant to attend to anything other than the 
litigation process concerning governmental adjudicatory bodies.189  
Section 1782 was titled ―An Act to Improve Judicial Procedures of 
Serving Documents, Obtaining Evidence, and Proving Documents in 
Litigation with International Aspects.‖190  The Report uses the terminology 
―international or foreign tribunal‖ sixty-one times in the 105-page 
Commission Report; however, only fourteen of those mentioned are within 
§ 1782.191   
To determine the significance of the terms ―international or foreign 
tribunal‖ within the § 1782(a) amendments, the statutory scheme of the 
forty-seven other usages will help decipher its meaning.192  The 
Commission Report first used the terms ―international or foreign tribunal‖ 
                                                          
 185. See NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1999).  The court 
observed that academic literature supported its conclusion that ―foreign tribunals‖ were only 
those formed by international treaty.  Id. at 190.  The court also noted that the 1962 law 
review article written by Hans Smit stated that ―an international tribunal owes both its 
existence and its powers to an international agreement.‖  Id. at 190 (quoting Smit, supra 
note 47, at 1267).  
 186. NBC, 165 F.3d at 189-90.  
 187. Harry L. Jones, International Judicial Assistance:  Procedural Chaos and a 
Program for Reform, 62 YALE L. J. 515, 538 (1953). Section 1782 was part of the following 
amendments to the U.S. code pertaining to procedures in international litigation:  (1) 
Instructing when perjury laws are applicable to testimony found outside the United States, 
18 U.S.C. § 1621; (2) Improvement of the procedures for the service of subpoenas in 
international litigation, 28 U.S.C. § 1745; (3) Instructing when a foreign document requires 
a single certification, 18 U.S.C. § 3491; (4) Categorization of procedures for transmittal of 
letter rogatory or request, 28 U.S.C. §1781;  
(5) Repeal of 22 U.S.C. §§ 270–270(g) (repealed 1964); replaced by amended  
28 U.S.C. § 1782; (6) Repeal of 28 U.S.C. 1785 (repealed 1964), replaced by  
28 U.S.C. 1782; and (7) Clarified service in foreign and international litigation  
28 U.S.C. § 1696.  Id.   
 188. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 86, at 1. 
 189. See id. at 13 (stating that the purpose of the Commission was to propose to the 
President actions that ―may appear advisable to improve and codify international practice in 
civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings‖).  
 190. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).  
 191. Id. at 43-47.  
 192. See generally Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 836 (2010) (noting that ―‗[t]he 
words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall 
statutory scheme.‘‖) (quoting Davis v. Michigan Dep‘t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 
(1989).  
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in discussing the repeal of 22 U.S.C. §§ 270-270c,193 recommending that it 
extend beyond application to cases involving U.S. nationals or the U.S. 
government.194  However, the only usage of ―international or foreign 
tribunal‖ in the Commission‘s Fourth Report refers to a governmental-
sponsored tribunal the United States German Mixed Claims 
Commission.195  The sole reason for repeal of this provision in the 1964 
amendments was to expand the scope of persons who could utilize § 
1782(a) by effectively eliminating the requirement that U.S. nationals or 
the U.S. government be parties to the proceeding.196  However, the repeal 
did not change the requirement that the foreign tribunal be state-
sponsored.197  
The subsequent section that uses ―international or foreign tribunal‖ 
pertains to 28 U.S.C. § 1696, enacted to assist the service of process ―in 
foreign or international litigation.‖198  This statute mandated that service 
―be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign 
or international tribunal . . . .‖199   
As noted earlier, letters rogatory are formal requests from a court in one 
country to ―the appropriate judicial authorities‖ in another country 
requesting compelled testimony, documents, or other forms of evidence.200  
It is important to note that private citizens and arbitrators are not permitted 
to issue letters rogatory—they must be sent and received by national 
courts.201  Therefore, the usage in this section of ―international or foreign 
tribunal‖ did not include private international arbitration because letters 
rogatory requires sovereign-to-sovereign transmission.202  
The third section that refers to an ―international or foreign tribunal‖ is in 
the discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 1781, which included a provision relating to 
the transmission of letters rogatory.203  Section 1781 contains four 
                                                          
 193. 22 U.S.C. §§ 270-270c (1940).  This statute pertained to obtaining evidence in the 
United States to assist foreign adjudicatory state-proceedings.  
 194. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 86, at 46.  This suggestion is similar to the 
1948 amended language of § 1782 removing the requirement that a sovereign have an 
interest in the suit.  See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 195. See FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 86, at 36 (1963). 
 196. See id. at 36-37 (advocating elimination of this requirement and extension of 
discovery to a broader category of persons implicated in the proceedings). 
 197. See id. at 36 (arguing that the limitation of discovery to proceedings in which the 
United States or a U.S. national is involved is ―undesirable‖ and should be eliminated but 
not addressing extending discovery to arbitral proceedings beyond that). 
 198. Id. at 37.  
 199. Id.  
 200. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (explaining letters rogatory).  
 201. See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 905 (6th ed. 1990) (Letters Rogatory are ―[t]he 
medium whereby one country, speaking through one of its courts, requests another country, 
acting through its own courts and by methods of court procedure . . . to assist the 
administration of justice in the former country.‖) (emphasis added). 
 202. See id.  
 203. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 86, at 42–43.  This amended statute 
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references to the transmission or receipt of letters rogatory to ―international 
or foreign tribunals.‖204  As previously stated, a private arbitrator is not 
authorized to transmit or receive a letter rogatory, and therefore the use of 
―international or foreign tribunal‖ within this section cannot refer to private 
international arbitration.205  
The last section that uses ―international or foreign tribunal‖ contains 
what became § 1782, which permits a U.S. court to grant discovery in 
connection with proceedings before ―an international or foreign 
tribunal.‖206  The prior forty-seven uses in the statutory scheme do not 
include a reference to private international arbitration and there is no 
indication that the usage in § 1782 derogates from the prior ―international 
or foreign tribunal‖ uses.207  Therefore it would be inconsistent with the 
statutory scheme to consider the term ―tribunal‖ in § 1782(a) to include 
private international arbitration proceedings, when every other section 
exclusively references state-sponsored proceedings when discussing 
―tribunals.‖208  
D. Interpreting “Tribunal” To Encompass Private International 
Arbitration Would Undermine Fundamental Principles of Arbitration  
Despite the plain language, legislative history, and statutory scheme of § 
1782(a), the Roz Trading court and its followers have frustrated the 
purpose of the statute by failing to recognize crucial differences between 
private arbitration and government-sponsored adjudicatory bodies.209  
Further, applying the factors set forth in Intel to private arbitration violates 
arbitration‘s fundamental principles.210  Because discovery procedures in 
arbitrations are predetermined and foreign arbitrators are typically opposed 
                                                          
designated the State Department as the ―central authority‖ and permitted the Department to 
receive and transmit letters rogatory between a ―tribunal in the United States‖ and an 
―international tribunal, officer, or agency to whom it is addressed.‖  Id. at 42. 
 204. Id.  
 205. See supra notes 24, 201 and accompanying text (discussing the requisite that letters 
rogatory be transmitted through official measures, sovereign-to-sovereign).   
 206. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 86, at 43–44. 
 207. See id. at 45.  The other usages of ―international tribunal‖ clearly envisage a state-
agency that can receive or transmit letters rogatory; see also In re Medway Power Ltd., 985 
F. Supp. 402, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that the phrase ―proceeding in a foreign or 
international tribunal,‖ as amended to the statute in 1964, reflect a legislative intent to 
extend the reach of the statute only to foreign governmental agencies exercising a judicial or 
quasi-judicial function). 
 208. See supra notes 190-207 and accompanying text.  
 209. See infra part III.D.1.  See generally Louis L. C. Chang, Keeping Arbitration Easy, 
Efficient, Economical and User Friendly, 61 JUL DISP. RESOL. J. 15, 15 (noting that in order 
to maintain the benefits of arbitration, arbitrators ―should emphasize the differences between 
litigation and arbitration and urge parties to avoid importing judicial procedures into the 
arbitration if they want a swift but fair process.‖). 
 210. See infra notes 215-246 and accompanying text .  
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to permitting American-style discovery,211 the Intel factors in the context of 
private international arbitration should be considered inapplicable.  
Finally, expanding § 1782(a) to private international arbitration panels 
would place a heavy burden on the federal court system,212 alter the public 
policy favoring private arbitration,213 and place certain parties at a 
significant disadvantage.214 
1. Fundamental Arbitration Principles 
Private international arbitration is a creature of contract that permits 
parties to settle their disputes outside the public judicial system.215  The 
parties are able to choose the procedural rules of the arbitration, giving 
them significant autonomy and control over the process that will be 
imposed to resolve their disputes.216  The will of the parties must control 
unless it violates a mandatory rule in the country where the arbitration 
takes place.217  Therefore, procedural questions, such as discovery, are 
usually agreed upon between the parties, or determined by the private 
institution administering the arbitration proceedings, prior to the 
commencement of the arbitration.218  
                                                          
 211. See generally Steven Seidenberg, International Arbitration Loses Its Grip:  Are 
U.S. Lawyers to Blame?, ABA J., April 2010, at 50, 54 (discussing the push-back of foreign 
arbitrators to American-style discovery in foreign arbitration proceedings).   
 212. Since § 1782(a) would require use of the federal court system to request documents 
or witnesses for private international arbitration proceedings, the federal policy behind 
favoring arbitration in part due to its ability to lessen the burden on federal dockets would be 
lost. See Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims:  Rights “Waived” and Lost in 
the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 385 (1996) (indicating that the motive 
behind the Supreme Court‘s pro-arbitration stance is a desire to reduce judicial dockets). See 
generally JULIAN D. M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 3 (2003) (listing an alternative forum to the national courts as one of 
arbitration‘s advantages).  
 213. See LEW ET AL., supra note 212, at 721. 
 214. See infra notes 277-282 and accompanying text; see also Cynthia Day Wallace, 
„Extraterritorial‟ Discovery and U.S. Judicial Assistance:  Promoting Reciprocity or 
Exacerbating Judicial Overload?, 37 INT‘L LAW. 1055, 1060–61 (2003) (observing that 
because there is no foreign discoverability requirement pursuant to the statute, application of 
§ 1782 would unfairly favor foreign parties).  
 215. See Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 
(1985) (―By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive 
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a 
judicial forum.  It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the 
simplicity, informality and expedition of arbitration.‖). 
 216. See MOSES, supra note 12, at 2 (―Arbitrators are . . . expected to apply rules, 
procedures, and laws chosen by the parties.‖); see also Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. 
Cont‘l Cas. Corp., 393 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (―[T]he parties [to an 
arbitration] . . . are the architects of their own arbitration process. . . .‖).  
 217. See NIGEL BLACKABY ET.AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 185 (5th ed. 2009) (explaining that while parties can chose a particular law to 
govern the procedure of their arbitration, the place of the arbitration may have certain 
mandatory laws that must be followed).  
 218. In instances where the parties have not pre-determined the procedural rules, private 
institutions administering the proceedings provide ―gap-filler‖ provisions.  
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Parties often engage in arbitration as a comparatively more efficient 
means of dispute resolution than litigation.219  Owing in part to the 
autonomy that the arbitration process affords to parties, arbitration 
proceedings can usually be initiated much more quickly than traditional 
court proceedings since the parties can select arbitrators as soon as the 
dispute arises.220  Further, if both parties agree to do so, they can obtain an 
arbitrator at very short notice, present their cases, and have their dispute 
resolved in a minimal amount of time.221  
Private international arbitration is also generally less expensive than 
traditional methods of litigation.222  Because arbitration proceedings can be 
held in a short period of time and the award may be issued without delay, 
the costs of arbitration may be minimal in comparison to lengthy 
procedures in national courts.223  
Additionally, arbitration can be less expensive than litigation because 
arbitrations have limited discovery.224  Although this varies depending on 
the institution selected to hear the arbitration proceeding, the background of 
the arbitrators, and the general will of the parties, discovery in an 
arbitration proceeding is more akin to the limited discovery procedures 
found in civil law countries.225  While this may force a party to prove a 
                                                          
See, e.g., INT‘L CHAMBER COM. RULES ARB. art. 15(1) (―The proceedings before the Arbitral 
Tribunal shall be governed by these Rules and, where the Rules are silent, by any rules 
which the parties, or failing them, the Arbitral Tribunal may settle on, whether or not 
reference is thereby made to the rules of procedure of a national law to be applied to the 
arbitration.‖). 
 219. See GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 9-11 (2001) 
(discussing how arbitration has long been thought to be a more efficient means than 
litigation for resolving international and domestic commercial disputes.)  
 220. See LEW ET AL., supra note 212, at 8 (noting that in some countries national court 
dockets are so overcrowded that it may require years for a hearing date to be set).  While 
parties have a wide variety of arbitrators to choose from, increasingly well-sought-after 
arbitrators are the source of some time delays.  See Lucy Reed, More on Corporate 
Criticism of International Arbitration, KLEWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Jul. 16, 2010), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/07/16/more-on-corporate-criticism-of-
international-arbitration/ (discussing how arbitrators should be more forthcoming on their 
busy schedules to facilitate the obtaining hearing dates in a prompt amount of time).   
 221. LEW ET AL., supra note 212, at 8.  
 222. Id. at 9 (explaining that arbitration, when held in a timely manner, tends to be less 
costly than litigation in national courts).  
 223. Id. (stating that complicated international arbitrations, which involve higher costs 
and more time than the usual speedy, cost-efficient arbitration, are still resolved more 
quickly and for less cost than cases in national courts).  
 224. See D. Brian King & Lise Bosman, Rethinking Discovery in International 
Arbitration:  Beyond the Common Law/Civil Law Divide, 12 I.C.C. INT‘L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 
24, 24, 27, 36 (2001) (discussing the extent to which the discovery process should be 
permitted in international arbitration and how to manage it); see also Seidenberg, supra note 
211, at 54 (discussing the ―push to curb the Americanization of arbitration,‖ specifically as 
it relates to American-style methods of discovery).  
 225. See INT‘L CHAMBER COM. RULES ARB. art. 20(2) (―[T]he Arbitral Tribunal shall 
hear the parties together in person if any of them so requests, or failing such a request, it 
may of its own motion decide to hear them.‖); U.N. Comm. on Int‘l Trade L., UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Int‘l Comm. Arb., art. 27, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985) (amended 2006) (―The 
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violation of the law or a contract with restricted access to documents, the 
limited scope of discovery is often what contributes to the efficiency and 
lower cost of participating in arbitration.226  
Last, private international arbitration is confidential.227  The proceedings 
in the arbitration are kept private between the parties and remain 
confidential to the public.228  The confidentiality includes the ―existence of 
the arbitration, the subject matter, the evidence, the documents that are 
prepared for and exchanged in the arbitration, and the arbitrators‘ 
awards. . .‖229  It also follows that only the parties to the proceedings and 
their legal representation may attend the arbitration hearing; each attendee 
is also subject to ―the duty of confidentiality.‖230  This is a clear and 
fundamental advantage for businesses contracting to arbitrate.231  
Companies prefer these confidential procedures to ensure that their 
company information is not disclosed to the public.232 In addition, many 
arbitration institutions provide for exemptions for trade secrets, which 
provide companies with the ability to keep their business strategies 
protected.233  
Many of these benefits would be foregone if American-style discovery 
were permitted in private arbitration.234  For example, private arbitration‘s 
                                                          
arbitral tribunal or a party with the approval of the arbitral tribunal may request from a 
competent court of this State assistance in taking evidence.‖) (emphasis added).  See 
generally GARY B. BORN, International Commercial Arbitration in the United States 825–27 
(Kluwer 2008) (discussing how the discovery process is significantly different than the 
process used in national courts).  
 226. See Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Beneficial Corp., No. 87 Civ. 5056 (CSH),  
1987 WL 17951, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29. 1987) (―[F]ull scale discovery is not 
automatically available in arbitration. . . [T]he unavailability of the full panoply of discovery 
devices, with their attendant burdens of time and expense, may fairly be regarded as one of 
the bargained-for benefits (or burdens, depending on one‘s subsequent point of view) of 
arbitration‖).  See Paul D. Deorgiadis & Paul A. Sinclair, Legal Fees- A Question of Trust, 
ARIZ. ATT‘Y, Apr. 1997, 409 (noting that arbitration forces parties to give up the right to 
broad discovery); see also J. Greenblatt and C. Ryan, New York Civil Practice Law and 
Rule 3102(C):  A Potential Tool for Parties Seeking Discovery in Aid of Arbitration,  
(November 2010) at 1, 
 http://www.investmentarbitration.net/journal-advance-publication-article.asp?key=371 
(noting that due to the limited discovery procedures in  arbitration, ―a party may be deprived 
of information necessary to assert claims or prove its case.‖). 
 227. LEW ET AL., supra note 212, at 8. 
 228. Id.  
 229. Id.  
 230. Id.; see e.g., INT‘L CHAMBER COM. RULES ARB., app. II art. 1(1) (―The sessions of 
the Court, whether plenary or those of a Committee of the Court, are open only to its 
members and to the Secretariat.‖).  
 231. LEW ET AL., supra note 212, at 8 (―[C]onfidentiality . . . is clearly a concept that 
many consider to be a fundamental and important advantage to arbitration.‖). 
 232. BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 217, at 136; LEW ET AL., supra note 212, at 8.  
 233. See, e.g.,  INT‘L CHAMBER COM. RULES ARB., art. 20(7) (―The Arbitral Tribunal may 
take measures for protecting trade secrets and confidential information.‖). 
 234. See Seidenberg, supra note 211, at 50-52 (discussing how American-style discovery 
is overcoming the many cost-efficient benefits of arbitration). 
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timeliness would likely be hindered if parties were required to wait for 
federal courts to rule on requests for discovery.235  Since Intel held that 
discovery requests must be determined on a case-by-case basis while the 
federal court determines whether a request for discovery should be granted, 
the entire arbitration process would be delayed and the costs of 
participating in arbitration would likely increase.236  
In addition, permitting parties to use the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to obtain full discovery would have drastic effects on the world 
of private arbitration.237  Allowing parties to circumvent their negotiated 
contractual agreements to obtain American-style discovery undermines the 
fundamentals of private arbitration and increases the cost and time required 
to settle these disputes.238  
Moreover, although private arbitration is confidential, parties who 
petition district courts pursuant to §  1782(a) must disclose information 
ordinarily kept private.239  The decisions by these courts are public.  As 
previously mentioned, many businesses prefer private arbitration not only 
because of the timeliness and cost-effectiveness, but also because it keeps 
the companies‘ disputes and information out of the public.240  Forcing 
companies to disclose vast amounts of confidential information that may 
not be kept private could negatively impact international businesses willing 
to come to the United States.241   
                                                          
 235.  Id. at 52-53. See, e.g, In re Caratube Int‘l Oil Co., LLP, Misc. Action No.  
10-0285 (JDB), 2010 WL 3155822, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2010) (where the Claimant 
requested for the ICSID arbitration proceedings to be delayed while the § 1782(a) discovery 
request was determined by the D.C. District Court).   
 236. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 267-68 (2004) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
 237. See generally Seidenberg, supra note 211, at 50–52 (discussing how 
Americanization of discovery in foreign arbitration is hindering the advantages of parties 
contracting to arbitrate.  
 238. Id.; see Intel, 542 U.S. at 267-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the high cost of 
American-style discovery); see also Anibal Sabater, Towards Transparency in Arbitration 
(A Cautious Approach), 5 BERKELEY J. INT‘L. L. 47, 51 (2010) (noting that when tribunals 
derogate away from the parties agreed upon terms, ―arbitrations run the risk of too closely 
resembling court litigation (with its delays, complexities, and publicity), which is exactly 
what many parties tried to avoid when they bargained for arbitration.‖) (emphasis added). 
 239. See generally BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 217, at 138-39 (noting that the 
confidentiality of arbitrations has diminished over time, including under U.S. laws).   
 240. See MOSES, supra note 12, at 4 (discussing how businesses prefer the confidential 
nature of arbitrations to keep their disputes private).  
 241. This is troublesome for businesses in the U.S. since any person or document located 
within the district of the court would be subject to the discovery request pursuant to § 
1782(a).  See Dana C. MacGrath, The Possibility of Judicial Assistance in Aid of 
International Commercial Arbitration Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, UNITED STATES COUNCIL 
FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, 
 http://www.enewsbuilder.net/uscib_news/e_article000348767.cfm?x=b11,0,w (describing 
how permitting businesses to use § 1782 for discovery in foreign arbitrations raises issues of 
parity between parties and requires assurances that ―discovery does not jeopardize business 
secrets or other confidential information.‖).  
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Finally, a fundamental premise of arbitration is to effectuate the will of 
the parties.242  Under § 1782(a) an ―interested person‖ may circumvent the 
contracted discovery procedures and request discovery pursuant to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.243  The statute could further frustrate the 
arbitration process because even if the arbitrator conducting the arbitration 
proceedings does not request a U.S. court‘s assistance to obtaining 
evidence, ―interested persons‖ may still request the information pursuant to 
§ 1782(a).244  This includes ―interested persons‖ who are nonparticipants in 
the proceeding.245  Therefore the principle that arbitration is a ―creature of 
contract‖ risks being violated because § 1782(a) would allow parties to 
contravene agreed upon contractual provisions and allow persons not 
directly involved in the dispute to petition courts for discovery for the 
proceedings.246  
2. The Intel factors should be considered inapplicable in the realm of 
private international arbitration 
Although the factors set forth in Intel may be helpful in determining 
whether a discovery request should be granted for a governmental 
adjudicatory body, they should be considered inapplicable in the context of 
private international arbitration.  First, Intel requires the district court to 
determine whether the person requesting the discovery is a participant in 
the foreign proceedings.247  If so, ―the need for § 1782(a) aid generally is 
not as apparent as it ordinarily is when evidence is sought from a 
nonparticipant in the matter arising abroad.‖248 However in private 
international arbitration, only the parties to the agreement are bound by the 
arbitration clause.249  Therefore, permitting nonparticipating parties to 
                                                          
 242. See In re Technostroyexport, 853 F. Supp. 695, 697-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (discussing 
the importance of upholding the contractual agreements of the parties to arbitrate under 
specifically chosen institutional rules); J. KIRKLAND GRANT, SECURITIES ARBITRATION FOR 
BROKERS, ATTORNEYS, AND INVESTORS 11 (1994) (explaining that arbitration is a creature of 
contract, and that absent a public policy against such arrangement, the intent of the parties 
will be enforced by courts).  
 243. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006). 
 244. Id.; see Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 256–57 (2004) 
(quoting Smit)(noting that the term ―‗any interested person‘‖ is ―‗intended to include not 
only litigants before foreign or international tribunals, but also foreign and international 
officials as well as any other person . . . [who] possess[es] a reasonable interest in obtaining 
the [required judicial] assistance‘‖); see also Sabater, supra note 238, at 50–51 (noting the 
inherent problems caused by permitting third-parties to intervene in arbitration proceedings 
without the agreement of the original parties).   
 245. See id. (and accompanying text).  
 246. Id.; see Sabater, supra note 219, at 50–51 (―Arbitration is a dispute resolution 
mechanism freely chosen and ultimately controlled by the parties. The have the last word on 
how the process is structured, including under what circumstances non-signatories of the 
arbitration consent should be able to participate in it.‖).   
 247. Intel, 542 U.S. at 264. 
 248.  Id. 
 249. See Starvos Brekoulakis, The Relevance of the Interests of Third Parties in 
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intervene in the arbitration proceedings may violate not only the arbitration 
agreement, but also a fundamental principle of arbitration.250  Because 
arbitration is a creature of contract, binding only the parties to the 
arbitration agreement, the first factor of Intel should be considered 
inapplicable in the context of private international arbitration.251  
Second, Intel requires district courts to determine the nature of the 
foreign tribunal, the character of the proceeding abroad, and the receptivity 
of the foreign government, court, or agency to the U.S. court assistance.252 
A district court‘s inquiry should consider ―only authoritative proof that a 
foreign tribunal would reject evidence obtained with the aid of section 
1782.‖253 However, in private international arbitration, the parties agree to 
be bound by limited discovery procedures.254  Therefore, unless the 
arbitrators expressly request for supplemental evidence, most arbitrators 
will be disinclined to accept the additional evidence.255  
Third, Intel requires the district court to evaluate whether the petitioner‘s 
request is an attempt to ―circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or 
other policies of a foreign country or the United States.‖256  In most 
circumstances, the requesting party will be petitioning the district court in 
an attempt to ―circumvent foreign proof-gathering‖ because the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure allow for liberal discovery while most private 
arbitrations institutions and civil law nations drastically limit requests for 
discovery.257  Further, if the discovery sought is necessary for the 
                                                          
Arbitration:  Taking a Closer Look at the Elephant in the Room, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1165, 
1166 (―The consensual nature of arbitration lies at the heart of this discussion:  only those 
persons that have clearly consented to an arbitration agreement may participate in the 
arbitration proceedings.‖).  
 250. Id. (discussing the principle of ―procedural party autonomy‖ which permits parties 
the ability to contractually determine the persons entitled to participate in the arbitration 
process.) 
 251. Id. (noting that arbitration proceedings are exclusively established by contractual 
provisions.) 
 252. Intel, 542 U.S. at 264. 
 253.  In re Euromepa, 51 F.3d 1095, 1100 (2d Cir. 1995).  
 254. See Card v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 806, 813-14 (D. Minn. 1996) 
(―Arbitration is a creature born of a contract between the parties who are desirous of 
avoiding litigation in a court of law.  Arbitration requires the parties to agree to rules of 
arbitration.  Frequently, rules of arbitration specially exclude the application of judicial rules 
of evidence.‖) (quoting Bowles Fin. Grp. Inc. v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 22 F.3d 1010, 1011 
(10th Cir. 1994)); see also DeSapio v. Kohlmeyer, 321 N.E.2d 770, 773(N.Y. 1974) (―‘It is 
contemplated that disclosure devices will be sparingly used in arbitration proceedings. If the 
parties wish the procedures available for their protection in a court of law, they ought not to 
provide for the arbitration of the dispute.‖).  
 255. See supra notes 224-25 (discussing international commercial arbitration‘s push 
back on American-style discovery in arbitration proceedings); see also Cynthia Day 
Wallace, „Extraterritorial‟ Discovery and U.S. Judicial Assistance:  Promoting Reciprocity 
or Exacerbating Judicial Overload?, 37 INT‘L LAW. 1055, 1066 (2003) (contending that 
most foreign jurisdictions have ―vehemently resisted ‗extraterritorial‘ U.S. discovery‖).  
 256. Intel, 542 U.S. at 264-65. 
 257. See Charles Moxley, Discovery in Commercial Arbitration, 68 AUG DISP. RESOL. J. 
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proceeding, the arbitrators should be the only persons permitted to request 
such evidence.258  
Last, Intel requires a district court to determine whether the request is 
unduly intrusive or burdensome.259  Although this could be a valid factor in 
the realm of private international arbitration, as stated above, the discovery 
requests should be left to the discretion of the arbitrators.260  It is the 
arbitrator‘s role, not the parties, to determine the information necessary for 
the proceeding.261 Therefore, the factors set forth in Intel, should be 
considered incompatible in private international arbitration.262  
3. Excluding private international arbitration from § 1782(a) does not 
contradict U.S. pro-arbitration policy 
The United States strongly favors arbitration agreements.263  Contrary to 
scholarly opinion, limiting § 1782(a) to governmental adjudicatory bodies 
                                                          
21, 23 (2008) (asserting that arbitrators, in order to keep the time delays to a minimum and 
costs lower, subject discovery to close scrutiny in arbitration); see also George M. von 
Mehern, Submitting Evidence in an International Arbitration, The Common Lawyer‟s 
Guide, 20 J. INT‘L ARB. 3, 285, 285 (2003) (contending that disputes may arise in 
determining the scope of discovery between common law and civil law attorneys); see also 
Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co.., 20 F.R.D. 359, 361 
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) (asserting that once a party agrees to arbitration, it ―cannot then vacillate 
and successfully urge a preference for a unique combination of litigation and arbitration‖ 
solely because a particular procedure of litigation would better serve that party‘s immediate 
needs).  
 258. See generally Louis Chang, Keeping Arbitration Easy, Efficient, Economical and 
User Friendly, 61 JUL DISP. RESOL. J. 15, 15 (2006) (noting that under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, the arbitrators have the power to issue document subpoenas to third parties 
for production at the hearing); see also supra note 225 (asserting the role of arbitrators in 
arbitration proceedings).  
 259. Intel, 542 U.S. at 265. 
 260. See George M. von Mehern, Submitting Evidence in an International Arbitration, 
The Common Lawyer‟s Guide, 20 J. INT‘L ARB. 3, 285, 286 (2003) (noting that although 
most international arbitration rules contain general provisions on the submission of 
evidence, broad discretion is left to the arbitrators).  
 261. Id. at 285 (―[T]he applicable ‗rule‘ in international arbitration is that the tribunal has 
broad discretion to determine what evidence it should hear.‖).  
   262.    It is also important to note that while the Intel decision found it important that the 
DG-Competition findings were reviewable by a court of law,  and that the only opportunity 
for evidence to be introduce was during this investigatory stage, arbitration awards are 
usually only scrutinized by the private institution administering the proceedings, with 
limited grounds for their annulment in national courts. . See, e.g.,  International Chamber of 
Commerce Rules of Arbitration, art. 27 (2008) Scrutiny of the Award by the Court (―Before 
signing any Award, the Arbitral Tribunal shall submit it in a draft form to the [ICC] Court.  
The Court may lay down modifications as to the form of the Award and, without affecting 
the Arbitral Tribunal‘s liberty of decision, may also draw its attention to points of substance. 
No award shall be rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal until it has been approved by the [ICC] 
Court as to its form‖).  
 263. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 
(1985) (noting that federal pro-arbitration policy applies in particular to the field of 
international commerce); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974) 
(discussing the pro-arbitration policy embodied by the United States Arbitration Act). 
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preserves the federal government‘s pro-arbitration policy.264  The reason 
behind liberally construing arbitration agreements is in part that it lessens 
the burden on the federal docket by keeping dispute resolution private.265  If 
private international arbitration proceedings are able to utilize § 1782(a), it 
will compel the use of the federal court system because parties can only 
obtain discovery orders from the federal courts.266  Section 1782(a) will 
further burden the federal system, because under Intel, courts are required 
to analyze on a case-by-case basis whether the request for discovery should 
be granted.267  
In addition, arbitration has been favored as ―swift, fair, and inexpensive 
remedy.‖268  However, recently, arbitration has come under criticism for its 
increasing costs and delays.269 International businesses and investors have 
begun to question whether arbitration is an effective forum for dispute 
resolution.270  If these actors determine that arbitration is an inadequate 
alternative to litigation, due to the increasing costs and time inefficiency, 
arbitration risks becoming obsolete.271  Therefore, permitting § 1782(a) to 
be used in private international arbitration further delegitimizes the process 
by negating many of the advantages of contracting to arbitrate.272  
Moreover, allowing § 1782(a) in foreign arbitration proceedings would 
construe the statute to permit, in certain circumstances, a foreign party to 
have liberal use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to obtain 
                                                          
 264. See supra Part III.A (discussing congressional intent to limit the application of § 
1782(a) to governmental proceedings while still espousing a pro-arbitration policy). 
 265. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 267-68 (1987) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (contending that pro-arbitration 
decisions are ―no doubt animated by [the Court‘s] desire to rid the federal courts of . . . 
suits‖); Barrentine v. Arkansas Best-Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 752–53 (1981) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court‘s failure to favor arbitration over 
litigation ―runs counter to every study and every exhortation of the Judiciary, the Executive, 
and the Congress urging the establishment of reasonable mechanisms to keep matters of this 
kind out of the courts.‖). 
 266. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006) (authorizing application to the federal courts for 
discovery in international proceedings). 
 267. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 268 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (reasoning that courts should not 
take a case-by-case approach because ―discovery and discovery-related judicial proceedings 
take time, they are expensive, and cost and delay, or threats of cost and delay, can 
themselves force parties to settle underlying disputes‖). 
 268. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 747, 748 (1981) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 269. See Lucy Reed, More on Corporate Criticism of International Arbitration, KLEWER 
ARBITRATION BLOG (Jul. 16, 2010), 
 http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/07/16/more-on-corporate-criticism-of-
international-arbitration/ (discussing the recent criticisms of arbitration surrounding the 
rising costs and increasing time required to settle disputes). 
 270. Id. (finding that a recent study showed that 100% of corporate counsel thought that 
international arbitration ―takes too long‖).  
 271. Id. (contending that the recent criticism of arbitration must be addressed in order to 
keep arbitration‘s legitimacy).  
 272. See supra note 265 (stating arbitration‘s traditional advantages over litigation).    
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documents and take depositions of any U.S. citizen, while depriving that 
U.S. citizen of the same right.273  Since there is no reciprocity requirement 
under the statute, if the foreign party has no evidence in the United States 
and is not physically located within the U.S. jurisdiction, the U.S. party will 
be unable to obtain the same discovery request.274  This disparity could be 
determinative in the field of private international arbitration.275  Therefore, 
to preserve the principles and equity of arbitration,  
§ 1782(a) should be excluded from private international arbitration.276  
CONCLUSION 
Before Intel, district courts uniformly excluded private international 
arbitration proceedings from § 1782(a).277  The Intel decision, while 
expanding the notion of what constitutes an ―international or foreign 
tribunal,‖ has caused courts to apply ―Intel Factors‖ that are inapplicable to 
private arbitration proceedings.278  This has resulted in inconsistent rulings 
among U.S. courts and grave concern for private contractual agreements 
agreeing to arbitrate under certain pre-determined procedures.279 
Businesses have increasingly looked to private international arbitration 
to resolve their disputes in a timely, cost-effective, and confidential 
manner.280  The steady increase in private arbitration proceedings magnifies 
the need for a uniform definition of what constitutes an ―international or 
foreign tribunal‖ to create congruency among the circuits.281  Although the 
                                                          
 273. See supra text accompanying note 39 (discussing broad discovery provisions under 
American law that are unavailable under the laws of civil law countries); see also Pedro J. 
Martinez-Fraga, The Future of 28 U.S.C. § 1782:  The Continued Advance of American-
Style Discovery in international Commercial Arbitration, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 89, 90 
(2009) (suggesting that a U.S. party contracting to arbitrate with a foreign person may be 
―decisively and materially disadvantaged should a dispute arise precipitating the invocation 
of an arbitration clause and, consequently, the possible filing of a  
§ 1782 petition by the adverse party.‖).  
 274. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006); see also Cynthia Day Wallace, „Extraterritorial‟ 
Discovery and U.S. Judicial Assistance:  Promoting Reciprocity or Exacerbating Judicial 
Overload?, 37 INT‘L LAW. 1055, 1060–61 (2003) (discussing the inherent problems that 
U.S. citizens face because the statute does not require the discovery sought by the foreign 
party to be reciprocal). 
 275. Id. 
 276. See supra Part III.D (arguing that application of § 1782(a) undermines the 
fundamental principles of arbitration). 
 277. See Part II.A. (discussing the Second and Fifth Circuits decisions holding that § 
1782(a) did not apply to private arbitration). 
 278. See Part II.C. (examining why the Intel factors are ill-suited for private arbitration 
proceedings).  
 279. See supra Part II (discussing contradictory rulings among federal district courts in 
the wake of Intel). 
 280. See generally MOSES, supra note 12, at 4 (discussing the advantages of businesses 
participating in arbitration); BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 217, at 31–34.  
 281. See supra note 75 (demonstrating the increase in arbitration filings from the 
enactment of § 1782(a) to present).    
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1964 Amendments clearly broaden § 1782(a), the statutory language, 
legislative history, and statutory scheme clearly demonstrate Congress‘s 
exclusion of private international arbitration pursuant to the statute.282  
Even if the courts are attempting to further the United States‘ pro-
arbitration policy by liberally construing § 1782(a) to extend to 
international arbitration proceedings, courts are affectively defeating the 
principles of arbitration by flooding the federal dockets and creating an 
expensive, time-consuming, non-confidential process.283  The current trend 
will only discourage international businesses from entering the United 
States, a consequence in the current economic atmosphere that the United 
States cannot afford to suffer.284   
 
                                                          
 282. See supra Part III.  
 283. See supra Part III.D (discussing the advantages of arbitration). 
 284. See Seidenberg, supra note 211, at 53 (noting that increased discovery in arbitration 
has frustrated businesses seeking to use arbitration and will discourage them from using the 
process).  
 
